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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1983
I. SUPREME COURT CASES
1. Hillsboro National Bank - Tax Benefit Rule
In Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, ' the United States Supreme
Court determined the applicability of the tax benefit rule to I.R.C. Section
164(e) deductions. The tax benefit rule is a "judicially developed principle that
allays some of the inflexibilities of the annual accounting system."' The usual
rule, which is set forth in Justice Blackmun's dissent,
As applied to deductions, appears to be this: whenever a deduction is
claimed, with tax benefit, in a taxpayer's federal return for a particular tax
year, but factual developments in a later tax year prove the deduction
to have been asserted mistakenly in whole or in part, the deduction, or
that part of it which the emerging facts demonstrate as excessive, is to
be regarded as income to the taxpayer in the later tax year.'
In Hillsboro, a corporate bank was entitled to a deduction for its pay-
ment of ad valorem personal property taxes' imposed on its shareholders pur-
suant to I.R.C. Section 164(e), which grants a corporation a deduction for taxes
imposed on its shareholders but assumed by the corporations.' Subsequent pro-
hibition by Illinois of ad valorem personal property taxes resulted in refunds
to the individual shareholders rather than the banking institution. The bank
did not include the amount of the refunds as income on its federal tax return.'
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency against
the bank,7 contending that the refunds should have been included as income
under the tax benefit rule.
The Tax Court held that the bank received "such a benefit from the refunds
to its shareholders as to constitute a 'recovery' and for purposes of the tax
benefit rule."' As such, the refunds must be included as taxable income of
the bank. To hold otherwise would be to allow the bank a deduction for a
dividend distribution. This holding was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals.9
1103 S. Ct. 1134(1983). The Hillsboro case was consolidated with United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. There,
a closely held dairy corporation deducted on purchase the full cost of cattle feed, a substantial portion
of which was still on hand at the end of the year. Two days into the next tax year, the dairy declared
a plan of liquidation. The Supreme Court, in applying the same test as in Hillsboro, held the dairy was
bound to include in income the amount of the unwarranted deduction despite the I.R.C. § 336 nonrecogni-
tion, since the liquidation was fundamentally inconsistent with the I.R.C. § 162 deduction for ordinary
and necessary business expenses. Id. at 1150.
21d. at 1140.
'Id. at 1164.
'Ad valorem taxes are taxes fixed in proportion to the value of the property to be charged. BALLENTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY 39 (3d ed. 1969).
'I.R.C..§ 164(e) (1982).
6Hillsboro, 103 S. Ct. at 1138.
7Id.
873 T.C. 61, 66 (1979).
'641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981).
19841
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In making its analysis, the Supreme Court considered the general rule that
"unless a nonrecognition provision of the Internal Revenue Code prevents it,
the tax benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income when
events occur that are fundamentally inconsistentI ° with an earlier deduction." I
Since the purpose of the tax benefit rule is to approximate the results produced
by a transactional rather than annual tax accounting system, "a court must
consider the facts and circumstances of each case in light of the purpose and
function of the provisions granting the involved deductions."' 2
Applying these guidelines to the Hillsboro facts, the court held that even
though the bank in effect made a deductible dividend, it was not required to
recognize income. The Court concluded that the purpose of Section 164(e)
was to provide relief for corporations making such payments and that the act
of payment should be stressed rather than the ultimate use of the funds by
the state. Since the corporation itself received no refund, the refund to
shareholders was deemed a nonrecognition event. 3 Since the "changed cir-
cumstances" were not fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose of I.R.C.
Section 164(e), inclusion in income was not required.
The Hillsboro decision leaves the tax benefit rule soundly within judicial
discretion. The court rejected objective approaches offered both by the bank
(inclusion only where the taxpayer actually recovers the deduction) and the Com-
missioner (inclusion where events are in any way inconsistent with the deduc-
tion). Instead, the Court opted for a subjective, case-by-case approach that
requires a review of the "purpose" of a deduction followed by an evaluation
of whether changing circumstances are "fundamentally inconsistent" with that
purpose. The Court's approach thus leaves the tax benefit rule in a disturbing-
ly unpredictable condition.
2. Memphis Bank - Taxation of U.S. Obligations
The U.S. Supreme Court in Memphis Bank & Trust Company v. Garner,
faced the issue of whether a Tennessee bank tax, which taxed income derived
from federal obligations but not income from obligations of the State of Ten-
nessee or its political subdivisions, violated the immunity of obligations of the
United States from state and local taxation.
Tennessee law required every bank doing business in the State to pay 3
percent of net earnings to local governments.2 Net earnings as defined by statute
'The Court defines an event as fundamentally inconsistent "only if the occurrence of the event in the
earlier year would have resulted in the disallowance of the deduction." Hillsboro, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1146
(1983).
"Id. at 1138.
11Id. at 1144.
"Id. at 1149.
'103 S. Ct. 692 (1983).
'TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-751 (1976) (repealed 1983).
[Vol. 2
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included income received by a bank on obligations of the United States and
its instrumentalities, as well as interest on obligations of states other than
Tennessee. I
Memphis Bank brought an action in state court to recover approximateley
$57,000 in excise taxes paid on bank earnings for the years 1977 and 1978. 4
The parties stipulated that the Bank's tax liability was based entirely on in-
terest earned on various federal obligations and that if this interest were ex-
cluded from the computation, Memphis Bank would owe no taxes for the years
in question.5
The trial court granted summary judgment for Memphis Bank on the
ground that the Tennessee tax violated 31 U.S.C. Section 742, which provides
for a broad exemption of federal obligations from state and local taxation.'
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed noting the exceptions to tax immunity
under the federal statute7 for a nondiscriminatory franchise tax or other non-
property tax in lieu thereof.'
The U.S. Supreme Court found that in order to fall under either excep-
tion to the constitutional rule of tax immunity for federal obligations, the tax
must be nondiscriminatory. 9 The court then concluded that the Tennessee bank
tax discriminates in favor of its own securities and against federal obligations,
by excluding them from the tax base while including comparable federal obliga-
tions in the tax base."1
The position of the U.S. Supreme Court as reflected by this and other
recent decisions is that a state may not impose a tax, the economic burden of
which falls on the federal government, unless such tax is nondiscriminatory."
The significance of Memphis Bank is that the Supreme Court shed more light
on what constitutes a nondiscriminatory tax. A state tax that imposes a greater
burden on holders of federal property than on holders of similar state prop-
erty impermissibly discriminates against federal obligations. 2 Although the
court determined this to be impermissible discrimination, it did not foreclose
the possibility that there might be other criteria used in the future to determine
what is impermissible discrimination.
'TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-805 (1983).
'Memphis Bank, 103 S. Ct. at 694.
'Id. at 695.
'Id.
'Memphis Bank & Trust Company v. Garner, 624 S.W.2d 551 (1981).
'31 U.S.C.A. § 742 (1982).
'Memphis Bank, 103 S. Ct. at 696 n.6 (1983).
'"Id. at 697.
"United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459-462 (1977).
"Memphis Bank, 103 S. Ct. at 696 (1983).
19841
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3. Tufts - Realization and Nonrecourse Debt
The heart of the issue resolved in Commissioner v. Tufts,' concerns what
is the amount realized by a taxpayer in sale that includes nonrecourse debt
assumed by the purchaser. The Supreme Court held that the amount realized
includes the full amount of the assumednonrecourse debt regardless of the
fair market value of the property transferred.'
In Tufts, a corporation and several individuals formed a general partner-
ship to construct an apartment complex.3 The partnership obtained a loan of
$1,851,000 to cover the entire cost of the construction, but the partnership itself
was not personally liable." The complex was built, but due to deteriorating
economic conditions it was never fully occupied. 5 Income generated from the
complex was not enough to reduce the mortgage and after one year, each part-
ner sold his partnership interest in the project, which had $1,851,000 in
nonrecourse liability and a fair market value of $1,400,000.6 The purchaser
also agreed to pay the partner's sale expenses up to $250 and acquired the prop-
erty subject to the nonrecourse liability. 7
During the partnership's life, each partner individually claimed his share
of losses incurred, reducing the partnership's basis in the property to $1,455,740.8
Each partner had computed his basis to include his share of the entire $1,851,000
mortgage. The partners did not, however, include the full amount of the
nonrecourse liability in the amount realized upon the sale.9 Instead, each part-
ner took a long term capital loss arguing that footnote thirty-seven of Crane
v. Commissioner" applied, and stating that nonrecourse liabilities should only
be included in amounts realized to the extent of the fair market value of the
property securing the indebtedness.The Commissioner denied the loss, assert-
ing that the full amount of the nonrecourse liability was the amount realized
on the sale and that each partner thus realized a taxable gain.I l Authority for
the Commissioner's holding was section 1001(b) of the Internal Revenue Code'2
'103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
'Id. at 1836.
1Id. at 1828.
"Id.
'Id. at 1828-29.
Old. at 1829.
'Id.
Old.
9ld.
-0331 U.S. 1 (1947). Footnote 37 reads as follows:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who
is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different
problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it sub-
ject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not the case.
331 U.S. I at 14 n.37.
"Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at 1829.
121d.
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and Treasury Regulation 1.1001-2(a)(1).' 3
In a suit for a refund, the Tax Court held that the fair market value was
irrelevant and denied the refund because the amount realized included the full
amount of the nonrecourse liability.' 4 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the amount realized on the disposition of nonrecourse
liability was limited by the fair market value of the encumbered property.' 5
Although the Court of Appeals expressed concern about abusive tax shelters
used solely for the purpose of obtaining large tax deductions without a substan-
tial investment of personal funds, they felt that the solution did not lie in
expanding the meaning of "amount realized."' 6
In reaching its decision to reverse the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court
relied on the 1947 case of Crane v. Commissioner, 7 and the 1978 case of Millar
v. Commissioner. , The taxpayer in Crane inherited an apartment building and
lot subject to a mortgage which had a tax appraised value equal to the total
amount of the encumberance. I9 Taxpayer operated the apartment building for
the next seven years while taking deductions for taxes, operating expenses, and
interest paid on the mortgage and reporting income on the rentals." The tax-
payer sold the property to a third party for cash and was completely discharged
from the debt, even though the purchaser did not become personally liable
for the debt.2 ' The value of the property exceeded the value of the mortgage. 22
The Supreme Court held that the amount realized included the full amount
of the mortgage liability discharged. The Court was concerned with the reality
that an owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than the fair market value,
must treat the mortgage as his personal obligation. 23 The economic benefit to
the seller is real and as substantial as if the mortgage was discharged, or as
if personal debt had been assumed by another.24
The Tufts Court reaffirmed its holding in Crane and concluded "that the
same rule applies when the unpaid amount of the nonrecourse mortage ex-
ceeds the value of the property transferred." 2 Nonrecourse loans are treated
"Id. at 1832-33.
"Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 769-70 (1978).
'Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981) reh'g denied (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 960
(1982).
6651 F.2d at 1060-61.
"331 U.S. 1 (1947).
1577 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
"Crane, 331 U.S. at 3.
20d.
"Id.
"1d. at 4.
11Id. at 14.
"Id. at 13.
"Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at 1831.
1984]
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as true loans.", "Nothing in either § 1001(b) or in the Court's prior decisions
requires the Commissioner to permit a taxpayer to treat a sale of encumbered
property asymmetrically, by including the proceeds of the nonrecourse obliga-
tion in basis but not accounting for the proceeds upon transfer of the en-
cumbered property." 27 All footnote 37 did was to acknowledge "the limita-
tions of that theory (economic benefit theory) when applied to a different set
of facts.""8
4. Bob Jones University - Denial of Tax Exempt
Status for Racially Discriminatory Schools
Until 1970, private schools enjoyed tax-exempt status regardless of their
racial admissions policies under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
("the Code").' In addition, the Internal Revenue Service granted taxable deduc-
tions for contributions to such schools under Section 170 of the Code.2
This tax-exempt status changed in July of 1970, when the IRS ruled that
private schools which practice racial discrimination could no longer enjoy tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(3).' The IRS also concluded that gifts to
such schools could not be treated as charitable deductions for income tax pur-
poses under section 170." Private schools were formally notified of this change
in policy by the IRS in a letter dated November 30, 1970.1
Bob Jones University ("Bob Jones" or "University") and Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools ("Goldsboro" or "School") are two schools that practice racially
discriminatory admissions policies. In a consolidated action before the United
States Supreme Court, the schools challenged the IRS' amended construction
of the tax Code.6 The petitioners argued that the IRS' interpretation of the
Code and its resulting actions constituted "legislating" and as such, violated
the right of religious schools to exercise freely their religious tenets.7
"Id.
"Id. at 1834.
2"Id.
'l.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). Section 501(c)(3) exempts the following organizations from taxation: "Cor-
porations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition. ... Id.
'I.R.C. § 170 (1976). Section 170(a) allows deductions for "charitable contributions." Section 170(c) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(c) Charitable contributions defined. For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution"
means a contribution or gift to or for the use of ...
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest fund, or foundation . . .
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition .... or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . .
Id.
'Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
4Id.
'Id.
'Bob Jones University v. U.S., 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
'd. at 2031.
[Vol. 2
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Historically, charities have occupied a protected position in our community.
As early as 1861 the United States Supreme Court announced that the "courts
of chancery will sustain and protect . . a gift . . . to public charitable uses,
provided the same is consistent with local laws and public policy .... "I Since
1894, the federal income tax laws9 have provided an exemption for certain
charitable organizations'" because they serve desirable public purposes.
Bob Jones and Goldsboro argued that sections 501(c)(3) and 170 of the
Code make any "charitable, religious or educational" organization tax-exempt
regardless of its racial policies." Although the Code does not explicitly men-
tion racial discrimination, the Supreme Court analyzed sections 170 and 501(c)(3)
and concluded that inherent in the Code is the intent that tax exemption depends
on meeting "common law standards of charity."'I This means that before an
institution can attain tax-exempt status it must serve a public purpose and not
be contrary to public policy.' 3 Thus, religious and educational entities which
violate public policy are not charitable and as such cannot be tax-exempt.
Since Brown v. Board of Education" it has become clear that racial
discrimination in education is contrary to established public policy. The Brown
holding is not limited to public education. In Norwood v. Harrison,' the
Supreme Court held that free textbooks are a form of tangible financial
assistance benefiting public and private schools and as such cannot be provid-
ed to any school that practices racial discrimination.' 6
Racial discrimination in private education was also addressed in Runyon
v. McCrary. ' Runyon involved a civil rights action by parents of black children
who were denied admission to private schools solely on the basis of race. In
construing 42 U.S.C. § 1981,'" the Supreme Court held that racial discrimina-
tion in admissions to private, nonsectarian schools is unlawful.' 9
'Id. at 2027 (quoting Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465, 501 (1861)).
'Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-557 (1894).
"A common law definition of charity is found in Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S.
303 (1877): "A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy forbids, may be applied to almost any
thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." Id. at 311. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 374 comment f at 258 (1959); and Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially
Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAX. L. REV. 477, 483-500 (1981).
"Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2025.
"Id. at 2026.
1I3d.
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"413 U.S. 455 (1973).
"Id. at 469.
"427 U.S. 160 (1976).
"42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and to enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . Id.
"9427 U.S. 160 (1976).
19841
9
Briner and Childs: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1985
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2016
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
In light of these decisions it is evident that the racially discriminatory ad-
missions policy of Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools neither
furthers an established public policy nor confers a public benefit. This is so
even though the schools' policies are based upon a sincere religious belief."0
Even if the IRS was correct in concluding that racial discrimination in
private schools violates public policy, Goldsboro and Bob Jones argued that
the IRS did not have the authority to issue its 1970 and 1971 rulings. Both
institutions alleged that the IRS "legislated" for Congress because the rulings
altered the scope of the Code."
Although not specifically mandated, the power of the IRS to construe the
Internal Revenue Code has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in a long
line of precedents.2" Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, noted that
these precedents illustrate that the IRS has the duty to determine whether a
particular organization is "charitable" for the purpose of sections 170 and
501(c)(3).Y Burger concluded that coupled with this duty is the authority of
the IRS to determine whether an organization's activities are so contrary to
public policy that it is unable to provide a public benefit worthy of tax-exempt
status.24
By denying tax-exempt status to schools that practice racially discriminatory
admission policies, the IRS hopes to further a national goal of nondiscrimina-
tion in all areas. Although this may significantly impair future contributions
to such schools, denial of tax exemption may not be an unduly harsh penalty,
and it is unlikely that schools such as Bob Jones and Goldsboro will be forced
to close their doors.
Although the courts should discourage nonlegislative bodies from
legislating, they cannot prevent the IRS from interpreting the tax laws. The
IRS successfully avoided the frustration of established federal policies by its
interpretation of sections 501(c)(3) and 170. The Bob Jones Court, by support-
ing the IRS, strengthened this nation's commitment to nondiscrimination.
5. Norris - Sex-Based Annuity Tables Result in Unlawful Discrimination
In 1978 the United States Supreme Court decided in Los Angeles Dept.
of Water & Power v. Manhart' that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ot 1964
prohibits an employer from requiring female employees to make larger con-
"Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2030. In order to determine whether given activities provide a public benefit,
contemporary standards must be used. See Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
'Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2031.
"Id. (citing Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); U.S. v. Correll, 389 U.S.
299, 306-307 (1967); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469-470 (1900)).
"Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2032.
241d.
'435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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tributions to a retirement system in order to obtain the same monthly pension
benefits as male employees. As a follow-up to Manhart, the Supreme Court
in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris2 has ruled that Title VII is also
violated when an employer offers its employees the option of receiving retire-
ment benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer, all of
which pay women lower monthly retirement benefits than men who have made
the same contributions as a result of the use of sex-based actuarial tables.'
The Supreme Court reasoned that Title VII requires employers to treat
employees as individuals and not as members of a racial, religious, sexual, or
national class." Just as it would be unlawful to use race-based actuarial tables,
so too is it unlawful for the employer to rely upon sex-based tables.5 The tradi-
tional use of the sexual distinction to identify life expectancy differences, so
as to justify class-based treatment, is no longer permitted, even though the
generalization that women as a class live longer than men is true.6 After all,
the majority opinion reasons, actuarial studies could unquestionably identify
differences in life expectancy based on race or national origin, as well as sex. 7
Having found that the Arizona deferred compensation plan violated Title
VII, the Supreme Court deemed retroactive relief inappropriate, so that similar
plans need only be concerned about eliminating payment differentials based
on sex prospectively.' Of course, any similar defined contribution plan employer
can avoid even prospective adjustments by simply discontinuing the use of a
life annuity as a form of benefit distribution. Indeed, this is apparently the
course of action taken by the State of Arizona as a result of the Norris litigation.'
Unfortunately, eliminating the life annuity as a retirement choice may have
adverse financial and tax consequences for employees. ' I
It should be stressed that the decision in Norris does not prevent insurance
companies from offering sex-based annuities to the general public. The pro-
hibition against the use of sex-based actuarial tables extends only to employee
benefits," and does not mean that sex-based annuities themselves are illegal.
2103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
'In Norris, each employee had the options of selecting a lump sum payment or periodic payments for a
fixed period rather than a monthly-paid annuity. These options, as well as the fact that participation in
the deferred compensation plan is voluntary, were deemed irrelevant. 103 S. Ct. at 3497. n.10.
'Id. at 3496.
'Id. at 3498.
'Id. at 3499.
'Id. at 3498.
'The separate opinion written by Justice Powell cites Department of Labor Cost Study 32 as setting the
cost of retroactive relief from $817 to $1260 million annually for the next 15 to 30 years. Id. at 3510.
'Id. at 3506, n.6.
"Alternate use of the lump sum distribution form of benefit payment may produce an extraordinary tax
liability in the year of distribution, since ten-year income averaging under I.R.C. Section 402(e) does not
apply to all lump sum distributions and income averaging under I.R.C. Section 1301 may not provide
equivalent tax relief. Installment payments over a fixed period obviously fail to provide lifetime income
security in the manner of a life annuity.
'Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. covers unlawful employment
practices.
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II. DEDUCTIONS
6. Deductible Meal Expenses
In 1983 the Treasury Department issued additional regulations relating
to the computation and substantiation of meal expenses incurred in connection
with travel.' As explained in Rev. Proc. 83-71,2 the new regulations permit
the taxpayer to use an optional method of computing meal expenses. Such
a method reduces the taxpayer's burden of accurate record keeping.
Pursuant to section 274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code and the
corresponding regulations,3 deductions for travel expenses are generally
disallowed unless the business purpose, time, place and amount of each
expenditure are substantiated by sufficient evidence. Prior to the 1983
amendment to the regulations under Section 274(d), the only method available
for substantiating such deductions was by presenting actual receipts and other
forms of primary records.4
Meal expenses that qualify as Section 162(a)(2) expenses paid or incurred
after December 31, 1982, may be calculated on the basis of a specified per
day amount.' If the taxpayer elects to use this optional method, the method
must be used for all meal expenses incurred during the year.6
The allowable meal expense deduction, under the optional method, is
computed as follows:
(a) $14 per day for travel that requires a stay of less than 30 days in one
general locality where the taxpayer's trade or business activity is
conducted; or
(b) $9 per day for travel that requires a stay of 30 days or more in one
general locality where the taxpayer's trade or business activity
is conducted.'
The first and last day of travel away from home must be apportioned
according to the actual time spent in business travel. The allowable deduction
for meal expenses is prorated over each six-hour quarter of the day involved
in business travel.
The optional method defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(h) applies only to
meal expenses incurred in travel away from home. Respecting other such
expenses, the elements of time, place, and business purpose must be substantiated
'Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(h) (1983), T.D. 7909, 1983-2 C.B. 55.
'Rev. Proc. 83-71, 1983-2 C.B. 590.
'Treas. Reg. §§ 1.274-1, 1.274-5 (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c)(2) (1982).
'Rev. Proc. 83-71, 1983-2 C.B. 590, 591 § 3.
6Id.
'Id. at .01.
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according to the rules set forth in Treas. Reg. §§ 1.274-5(b)(2) and 1.274-5(c).,
Where the taxpayer is reimbursed for meal expenses, the optional method
may be used only if:
(a) the taxpayer does not receive a per diem allowance for both meals
and lodging;
(b) the reimbursement received is reflected as income on the taxpayer's
federal income tax return;
(c) the taxpayer is not required to account for the actual expenses subject
to reimbursement; and
(d) the taxpayer is not related to the person providing reimbursement,
as defined in Section 267(b) of the Code.9
Although the new optional computation rules for meal expenses reduce
the amount of record keeping for the taxpayer, it is necessary to realize that
in some circumstances, the per day allowance granted under the optional
method may be substantially less than the actual costs incurred for reasonable
and nonextravagant meals.
7. Home Office Expense
During 1983, three taxpayers were unsuccessful in obtaining deductions
for their home offices. Their attempts, however, help clarify the relationship
between two subparts of Code Section 280A. Section 280A(a) provides that
no deduction shall be allowed in connection with any dwelling used by the tax-
payer as a residence during the taxable year.1 Yet, Section 280A(c) provides
that under certain situations a limited deduction may be taken respecting the
exclusive and regular use by a taxpayer of a home office for the principal place
of any trade or business, or as a place of business used by patients, clients,
or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of
his trade or business. 2 The section further provided an additional requirement
that any use by an employee must be for the convenience of the employer.
In Moller v. United States,3 taxpayers were denied a deduction for a home
office because they were not engaged in a trade or business as required by Sec-
tion 280A. Mr. and Mrs. Moller spend approximately 42 hours per week
managing investment portfolios with a value of $13,500,000 to $14,500,000."
Although they were involved in a variety of activities, the evidence presented
indicated that the investments were purchased not for speculative purposes,
'd. at .02.
9Id. at .05.
I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1982).
1.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B) (1982).
'721 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
41d. at 811.
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but for long-term growth potential and generation of interest and dividends.5
Expenses incurred in the production of income are deductible under Sec-
tion 212.6 Since the enactment of Section 280A in 1976, however, the deduc-
tion for an office in the home is limited to activities considered a "trade or
business." The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit indicated that, for
taxpayers to qualify as being involved in a trade or business, their investments
have to be directed towards short-term trading.7 According to the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Levin v. United States,8 a "trader" is one who buys and sells securities
with reasonable frequency so as to catch swings in the daily market movings
and profit from these transactions on a short-term basis.9
The Court also noted that merely managing investments to maximize long-
term gain is not a trade or business. This is true irrespective of the magnitude
and the continuity of the portfolios being managed or of the amount of time
involved in their management. 10
In Green v. Commissioner, I the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
a taxpayer who was an account executive and was responsible for the manage-
ment of seven condominiums. The employer provided the taxpayer with ade-
quate office space, but the taxpayer also maintained an office in his home.
The taxpayer, although rarely meeting with clients in his home office, used
the office primarily to store files and to receive incoming telephone calls from
clients. I I
The Commissioner disallowed the Section 280A(c)(1) deduction for the
taxpayer's home office. The Commissioner contended that the lack of "in-
person" contact with clients in the taxpayer's home office resulted in the
disallowance of the deduction." But the Tax Court, 4 in an 8-to-7 decision,
ruled in favor of the taxpayers and allowed the home office deduction. The
Commissioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals relied on the requirements of the plain language
of the statute. 5 The Commissioner and the Court agreed that the taxpayer used
the room regularly and exclusively for business and that the use of the room
'Id. at 812.
6I.R.C. § 212 (1982).
'Moiler, 721 F.2d at 815.
'597 F.2d 760 (Ct. CI. 1979).
9Id. at 765.
"Moller, 721 F.2d at 814, (citing Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941)).
1"707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
"1d. at 405.
"Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428, 433 (1982).
4Green, 78 T.C. 428 (1982).
"Green, 707 F.2d at 406.
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to receive telephone calls was for the convenience of the employer. 6 The issue
in dispute was whether the clients actually used the home office for meeting
or dealing with the taxpayer, as required by Section 280A(c)(1)(a)(B).
Since the taxpayer dealt with clients only by telephone rather than in per-
son, the Court held that the lack of actual "in person" contact in the home
office resulted in the disallowance of the Section 280A(c)(l) deduction.'I The
Court referred to the substantial expense a taxpayer incurs when converting
a portion of a family dwelling into a home office and viewed such major ex-
pense as a sufficient reason for permitting the taxpayer to deduct home office
expenses. However, the Court did not deem the conversion of a bedroom into
a telephone room consistent with conversions requiring substantial expense. I8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the Tax Court decision,
disallowed the I.R.C. § 280A(l)(a) deduction. In doing so, the Court has
placed a more restrictive interpretation on the "use" requirement of I.R.C.
§ 280A(c)(1)(a)(B).
In Frankel v. Commissioner, '9 the Tax Court disallowed a home office
deduction for a newspaper editor because the office was not used by him to
meet or deal with clients.
Mr. Frankel was an editor of the editorial pages of The New York Times.
His working day started at his home in the Bronx, where he spent approx-
imately one hour each morning reading the newspaper, clipping materials,
writing memos on topics for follow-up editorials, and other activities. He then
drove to the Times' mid-town office and remained there until approximately
7 p.m. Next, he either returned to his home or attended various business-related
functions. At home, he would work in his home office in the evenings and
on weekends. During the evenings, he was in constant contact with employees
of the Times concerning changes for the second edition of the paper. He also
used the evenings for telephone calls with politicians at various levels of govern-
ment, labor leaders, and other community leaders.
The office at home was furnished with a desk, chairs, typewriter, filing
cabinets, bookcase, telephone, dictating machine, and a small black-and-white
television set used for watching public-affairs interviews, political speeches,
and press conferences. He also kept basic reference books in the office which
he used for writing and planning editorials.
The Court agreed that the taxpayer used the home office exclusively and
on a regular basis as a place of business in the normal course of his trade or
-business and that the exclusive use was for the convenience of his employer,
16"d.
"Id. at 407.
"d.
"82 T.C. 318 (1984).
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The New York Times. However, the Court held that a home office deduction
should be denied since the clients or customers did not physically visit the home
office.2"
It should be stressed that the Green and Frankel cases deal with employees
using an office at home. Presumably, similar deductions claimed by self-
employed individuals and employees of one-person closely-held businesses who
operate solely from an office in the home can be supported under the "prin-
cipal place of business" language of Section 280A(c)(1)(A).
8. Business Lunches
Section 262 of the Internal Revenue Code disallows deductions for per-
sonal, living, and family expenses. In Moss. v. Commissioner,' the United States
Tax Court applied this statute so as to make nondeductible certain "business"
lunches.
In Moss the taxpayer was a partner of a Chicago area law firm. Each day
the members of the law firm would meet at the same restaurant to discuss of-
fice matters. The taxpayer asserted that it was the unwritten policy of the law
firm to have all members of the firm meet for lunch to discuss the progress
of various cases and other pertinent matters.2
The law firm paid for the meals during these "luncheon conferences."
On the law firm's partnership returns for the tax years 1976 and 1977, the
amount paid for such meals was included in the amount deducted for "meeting
and conference" expense.3
The taxpayer was denied his proportionate share for these deductions on
his individual tax return. The Commissioner disallowed such expenses and
asserted that they were nondeductible personal expenses rather than ordinary
and necessary business expenses." The Commissioner based his argument on
the theory that although the conferences held by the law firm related to the
business function of the firm, the expenditures for meals at such conferences
were not ordinary and necessary.5
The Tax Court agreed with the position taken by the Commissioner. The
Court, realizing that the dividing line between personal expenses and business
expenses is not always clear, restated the test for business deductions in such
situations. Following the traditional view set out in prior decisions, the Court
placed the burden of proof on the taxpayer to demonstrate that the expenses
20ld.
'80 T.C. 1073 (1983).
'Id. at 1074.
'Id. at 1075.
'Id. at 1076.
'Id. at 1077.
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claimed were in excess of the amount that would otherwise have been incurred
for the taxpayer's personal purposes.6 Having failed to meet this burden of
proof, the taxpayer was denied the deduction.
Since daily meals are an inherently personal expense, the taxpayer must
prove that such expenses were directly related to an ordinary business func-
tion. Although the luncheon meetings contributed to the growth and success
of the partnership, the Court held that the meal expenses alone had no direct
relationship to such success and therefore was not deductible.
9. Determination of "At Risk" Amounts in Convertible Recourse Notes
Prior to Revenue Ruling 82-225' it was unclear what portion of a convert-
ible recourse note would be deemed "at risk" for purposes of certain loss
deductions.2 The "at risk" limitation rules3 apply to all taxpayers engaged in
certain activities." The rules limit any losses5 to the amount the investor could
actually lose on the investment and are specifically aimed at the tax shelter
investor.
The amount of the investment considered to be "at risk" is the sum of
all money plus the adjusted basis of all other property contributed by the in-
vestor to the activity. 6 Borrowed amounts are also deemed to be "at risk" if
the taxpayer is personally liable for repayment of the borrowed amount, or
has pledged property, other than property used in the activity, as security for
the borrowed amount.7 However, the "at risk" amount for pledged property
cannot exceed the net fair market value of the taxpayer's interest in the property.'
Amounts protected by non-recourse financing, guarantees, stop loss agreements,
or similar arrangements are not considered to be "at risk". 9
Although it is clear that non-recourse obligations are not amounts "at
risk", a more difficult question arises when the obligation is recourse convert-
ible to non-recourse upon the happening of one or more conditions. In these
situations the amount "at risk" is determined by examining the event that
causes the obligation to become non-recourse.° For the amount to be con-
'Id. at 1076.
'Rev. Rul. 82-225, 1982-2 C.B. 100.
21.R.C. § 465(d) (1982).
'1.R.C. § 465 (1982).
'I.R.C. § 465(c) (1982). Activities affected by the "at risk" limitation rules include motion picture films
or video tapes, farming, equipment leasing, oil and gas explorations or exploitations, geothermal deposit
explorations or exploitations, and other activities in which a taxpayer is engaged for carrying on a trade
or business, or for the production of income, not including real estate.
'I.R.C. § 465(b) (1982).
-1.R.C. § 465(b)(1) (1982).
'I.R.C. § 465(b)(2) (1982).
'Id.
'I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (1982).
"Rev. Rul. 82-225, 1982-2 C.B. 100-101.
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sidered "at risk", the event causing the conversion must have a substantial
economic relationship to the investment activity."
Satisfaction of the economic relationship test occurs when the property
involved in the activity eventually has sufficient value to support the debt obliga-
tion without the need of the investor's personal liability protection. 2 For ex-
ample, if the activity property is an orchard, the economic relationship test
will be satisfied when the orchard has reached a certain stage of development
so that its value is sufficient to support the debt obligation.' 3 Likewise, when
a movie reaches a certain stage of completion or generates a certain level of
box office receipts, satisfaction of the economic relationship test will result.'
However, if the event causing the conversion from recourse to non-recourse
has no substantial economic relationship but only exists to increase the "at
risk" amount, the partial recourse note will be treated as non-recourse and
considered "at risk". " Therefore, no loss deduction can be claimed against
that amount.
10. Charitable Contributions or Tuition?
In Revenue Ruling 83-104' the Internal Revenue Service sets forth six fac-
tual situations to illustrate the distinction between qualified charitable contribu-
tions and tuition payments made to an organization that operates a private
school. In each of the factual situations the donee is an organization described
in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The taxpayer in each situation
is the parent of a child who attends the school. The parent makes a payment
to the organization and such payment is not more than the cost of educating
the child.
The issue involved in these situations is whether a parent's contribution
to an organization can qualify for the charitable contribution deduction. Under
Section 170 of the Code,2 an individual can claim a deduction for contribu-
tions or gifts made to certain qualifying organizations.3 A contribution can-
not be deducted, however, unless it was voluntarily made without the expecta-
tion of receiving any financial benefit in exchange. Therefore, tuition payments
would not be deductible because the parent receives a benefit' in exchange for
his contribution.
''Rev. Rul. 81-283, 1981-2 C.B. 115.
12Idf
"IS. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 48 n.1, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 57, 86 n.l.
"H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 n. 10, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 701, 802 n. 10.
"Rev. Rul. 82-225, 1982-2 C.B. 100-101.
'Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46 (superseding Rev. Rul. 79-99).
'I.R.C. § 170(a) (1982).
'I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982).
4However, procurring a financial benefit relating to one's trade or business may result in a deduction under
Section 162 see Treas. Reg. § 1.170 A-l(c)(5) (1972).
'The benefit received is having the child educated. Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46-47.
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In determining whether a contribution was made voluntarily without any
expectation of obtaining a benefit in exchange, the Service sets forth the follow-
ing list of factors to be considered: the existence of a contract under which
a taxpayer agrees to make a "contribution" and which contains provisions en-
suring the admission of the taxpayer's child; a plan allowing the taxpayers either
to pay tuition or to make "contributions" in exchange for schooling; the ear-
marking of a contribution for the direct benefit of a particular individual; or
the otherwise unexplained denial of admission or readmission to a school of
children of taxpayers who are financially able, but who do not contribute.,
The presence of any one of the above-mentioned factors may result in the denial
of Section 170 deductions.
In a recent case before the Tax Court,' the presence of some of these fac-
tors proved to be fatal to a parent claiming a charitable deduction for payments
made to a parochial school. The parent had made payments totalling $900 in
the form of checks. Some of these checks bore the notations "for Lora's
account", "for Lora's tuition" or "for Bob and Lora's tuition." Since these
payments were earmarked for tuition of specific individuals, the charitable
deduction was accordingly denied.
The Service also states that although no single factor may be determinative,
a combination of several additional factors may indicate that a payment is
not a charitable contribution. Such factors include: (1) the absence of a signifi-
cant tuition charge; (2) substantial or unusual pressure to contribute applied
to parents of children attending a school; (3) contribution appeals made as part
of the admissions or enrollment process; (4) the absence of significant poten-
tial sources of revenue for operating the school other than contributions by
parents of children attending the school; and (5) other indicia suggesting that
a contribution policy has been created as a means of avoiding the characteriza-
tion of payments as tuition.'
Ordinarily the presence of any one of these other factors will not result
in denial of the Sedtion 170 deduction. However, the existence of a combina-
tion of these other factors may result in denial of the deduction. Thus, in a
situation where no tuition is charged, where solicitation materials are part of
the school's application materials, and where parents of applicants are singled
out as a class for solicitation, no charitable deduction will be allowed.'
11. Deductions Relating to Temporary Rental of a Residence
Homeowners who undergo job transfers or who otherwise change
residences often.rent or attempt to rent their old residence pending its sale.
61d.
'Howard Lee Bass, 52 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 1 83,536 (1983).
'Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46.
'Id. (This describes situation #2 of the Revenue Ruling).
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Such was the case with the married taxpayers in Bolaris v. Commissioner,' who
attempted to deduct rental activity amounts in excess of rental income for two
taxable years,' while deferring a realized gain on the eventual sale of the old
residence under Section 1034.1
The Tax Court viewed the taxpayers' deductions beyond rental income
as subject to disallowance under Section 183(b),' which allows deductions nor-
mally connected with activities engaged in for profit5 only to the extent that
income from an "activity not engaged in for profit" exceeds related deductions,
such as those for interest and property taxes,6 that are allowable irrespective
of one's profit motives. The Court found the rental activity in question, which
resulted in the taxpayers' receiving fair market value rental payments for a period
of about nine months, to be merely "ancillary to sales efforts," and that the
taxpayers' "primary motive in leasing the property was to sell it at the earliest
possible moment rather than to hold it for the production of income."I Thus,
the Court deemed the taxpayers' rental activity correspondingly not to interfere
with a characterization of their old residence as a "principal residence" for
purposes of deferring gain recognition under Section 1034, since the term
"residence" could be consistently applied to a dwelling that was not used in
a "trade or business" or "held for the production of income," as these latter
terms are used in Sections 162, 167, and 212.
As Judge Wilbur pointed out in his dissent, an allowance of a tax benefit
under Section 1034 could be viewed as a basis for consistently disallowing tax
benefits under Sections 167 and 212 if it were clear that Congress intended
Section 1034 and Sections 167 and 212 to be mutally exclusive in their applica-
tion. Nevertheless, such mutual exclusivity was not intended, since Con-
gress specifically stated that either the old or new residence could be temporarily
rented (presumably with an economic or profit motivation) consistently with
the application of Section 1034.8 This issue of legislative intent may play a role
in the treatment of such deductions by other federal courts in the future. These
courts may also have to consider the effect of a series of cases that allowed
deductions based on the "held for the production of income" standard even
when the taxpayer had been unsuccessful in attempting to rent residential
'Bolaris v. Commissioner 81 T.C. 840 (1983).
'Mr. and Mrs. Bolaris had rental income of $1271 and $2717 for the years at issue, 1977 and 1978 respectively.
Their total rental related deductions for 1977 and 1978 exceeded rental income by $3,738 and $4,727
respectively. Id. at 843.
I1.R.C. § 1034 (1982).
4I.R.C. § 183(b) (1982).
'These deductions include those for depreciation, maintenance, insurance, and similar expenses otherwise
allowed by I.R.C. Sections 162, 167, and 212 respecting real estate rental activity.
'I.R.C. §§ 163, 164 (1982).
'Bolaris, 81 T.C. at 847.
'Judge Wilbur cites H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 109 (1951), 1951-2 C.B. 357, 377; S. REP.
No. 781 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 32 (1951), 1951-2 C.B. 458, 483.
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property.'
If one reads the Bolaris decision in light of its expressed reasoning,
disallowance of deductions under Section 183 should be upheld by the Tax
Court anytime rental activity is only ancillary to a primary attempt to sell a
residence, regardless of whether the taxpayer otherwise qualifies for or attempts
to use Section 1034. Since the nonprofit-motivated deductions for interest and
property taxes allowed under Sections 163 and 164 typically severely limit or
eliminate the use of profit-related deductions as a result of Section 183(b), a
large enough number of taxpayers will be affected by Bolaris so as to assure
ample future litigation.
Hopefully, Bolaris will not serve as a basis for denying capital loss deduc-
tions under similar circumstances. '0 In order for a homeowner to recognize
a capital loss, the loss must be "incurred in any transaction entered into for
profit under Section 165(c)(2)."l Although the literal code language would
suggest at first glance that sale of a residence could not qualify for loss recogni-
tion since the acquiring transaction was personal and not profit-motivated, the
Treasury Regulations under Section 16512 clearly permit a loss deduction respec-
ting sale of property acquired as a personal residence but converted to rental
use prior to sale. Indeed, the regulations contain an example that illustrates
a recognized loss for a taxpayer who acquired a personal residence, lived in
it for nine years, and then rented it for thirty-six months prior to selling it. 13
No distinction is made in the regulations under Section 165 between rental con-
versions merely "ancillary" to an intention to sell and conversions motivated
solely by profit considerations," although the Court that decided Bolaris might
otherwise view the length of the rental period as determinative at some point.
In the past, however, the Tax Court has been willing to recognize short rental
periods as establishing an income-producing use," and taxpayers should hope
that such tendency will continue, at least respecting Section 165 losses, not-
withstanding the reasoning in Bolaris.
'Briley v. U.S., 298 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1962); Horrmann v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 903 (1951); Robinson
v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 305 (1943).
"Taxpayers who purchase and sell their first residence in a "down" real estate market may realize losses,
as well as taxpayers who purchase and sell two homes during the Section 1034 replacement period, when
only the last of the subsequently purchased homes qualifies as the Section 1034 replacement residence.
"I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (1982).
"Treas. Regs. § 1.165-9(b) (1964).
"Treas. Regs. § 1.165-9(c), Ex. (1) (1964).
"One may note here that "legitimate" real estate investments are often motivated by total economic benefits,
which include, of course, both tax benefits and prospects for future appreciation. In many instances, such
motivations are sufficient to induce, purchases even though operating expenses meet or exceed a project's
cash flow, and the project is not otherwise structured as an "abusive tax shelter." Should motivations
for profit based in part on tax benefits be permitted to affect tax consequence when one temporarily invests
in an apartment building but be denied when one temporarily rents a residence while awaiting an adequate
purchase offer rather than market appreciation?
"Compare Froehl, Jr., 30 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 61,093 (Rental for 2 to 3 months insufficient to
convert residence to "income-producing property") with Rechnitzer, 36 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 67,055
(Loss allowed where rental before sale was only three months at a very small profit after depreciation.).
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12. Business Expenses Nondeductible Due to Lack of Compensation
Key shareholder/employees of closely-held businesses who draw no salary
during the start-up phase of an enterprise, or while the corporation retains
earnings for future use, should consider the effect of foregoing compensation
on the availability of personal business expense deductions relating to the enter-
prise under I.R.C. Sections 162 and 212. In Robert L. Van Fossan, Jr. v.
Commissioner,' the taxpayer was president and 50-percent shareholder in a
corporation formed to operate a restaurant business located 126 miles from
the taxpayer's residence. In order to be readily available to work in the restaurant
operation, the taxpayer purchased a nearby condominium and thus incurred
substantial living expenses while away from home.2 He'attempted unsuccessfully
to support his deductions for these expenses as ordinary and necessary business
or property management expenses under I.R.C. Sections 162 or 212, even though
he served as an officer and director of the corporation without present or pro-
spective compensation while working at the restaurant as much as ten to fifteen
hours per day.'
The Court in Van Fossen, Jr. emphasized that the record in the case con-
tained no indication that the taxpayer might obtain compensation for his efforts
from the corporation in future years and that the "mere speculative possibility"
of such was insufficient to support a finding that Mr. Van Fossen, Jr., was
engaged in a trade or business activity sufficient to allow his deductions.4
Presumably, payment of more than nominal compensation by the corpora-
tion during the taxable years in question would have made a crucial difference
in tax results.' As a planning proposition, such payments to similarly situated
shareholder/employees would be recommended, but what if the cash cannot
be spared?
In such event, the ultimate paying of compensation could be established
through an employment agreement providing for future payments to the
shareholder/employee. Deferred, or even contingent future compensation, con-
tractually determined, would at least give the taxpayer a fighting chance to
'52 TAX CT. MEM. DEC, 83,703 (1983).
'The taxpayer did not submit claims for reimbursement to the corporation for such expenses.
'Thus, for purposes of Section 162, without compensation he was not engaged in the trade or business
of being an employee of the corporation, and for purposes of Section 212(2), his expenses were deemed
to relate directly to the business of the corporation and not directly to his position as a shareholder, or
owner of potentially dividend-paying property. In writing his opinion in Van I-o.ssan, Jr., Judge Tannenwald
cites, among other cases dealing with the Section 212 concept, Deputy v. )upont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940),
which gives the statutory term "ordinary" the meaning of a "common or frequent occurrence in the type
of business involved." 308 U.S. 488 at 495. Apparently, the logic applied in Van I.'os.se'n, Jr. is to the
effect that a shareholder normally does not manage or conserve the income-producing capacity of shares
of stock by getting directly involved in the corporation's business operation. This reasoning perhaps ignores
the realities of owning a substantial interest in a closely-held business entity.
'Van Fossen, Jr., 52 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (P-H) 183,703 at 2922.
'Particularly if compensation exceeding the claimed deductions had been paid so as to eliminate adjustments
under I.R.C. Section 183 resulting from the potential assertion that the taxpayer's employment activity
was not "engaged in for profit."
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obtain otherwise appropriate deductions under Section 162.
Establishing compensation so as to establish the trade or business of be-
ing an employee appears to be the most productive approach toward allowance
of personal business expense deductions, since the Tax Court seems not to be
impressed by Section 212 arguments based upon the motivations of taxpayers
like Van Fossen, Jr. who devote extraordinary amounts of time, energy, and
resources to a new business in what must be the hope that someday the business
will afford them a substantial realizable value.6
If the requisite compensation cannot be established so as to support
business expense deductions under Section 162, perhaps the taxpayer's only
other hope to obtain a tax benefit from such expenses is an application of the
contribution to capital concept, which might result in an increase in the
shareholder/employee's basis in his shares.7 If Section 212 deductions are to
be denied on the ground that the taxpayer's activities are directly related to
the production of income to the corporation and the management of its prop-
erty rather than to production of income to the taxpayer and management of
his shares, it may not be far-fetched to agree that the taxpayer's expenditures
connected with such activities are tantamount to contributions to the corpora-
tion's working capital.
III. LEGISLATION AND TREASURY REGULATIONS
13. Technical Corrections Act of 1982
In January of 1983 the Technical Corrections Act of 19821 was enacted
to supplement the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,2 the Crude Oil Wind-
fall Profit Tax Act of 1980,1 the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980," and the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.1 Only a selection of these technical
amendments will be discussed.
A. Accelerated Cost Recovery System
Realty, classified as 15-year property under the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS),6 for the year the property is placed in, or taken out of service,
will have recovery allowances determined according to the number of months
'Denial of deductions under Section 212 under such circumstances no doubt results in at least an indirect
disincentive toward entrepreneurial activity.
'"Payments" made to (and perhaps for the benefit of) a corporation represent an additional price paid
for the shares of stock held by the individual shareholder who makes such payments. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 18-1
(1960)
'Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1982).
'Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
'Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
'Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980).
'Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
'I.R.C. § 168 (1982).
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the property was in service, regardless of the length of the taxpayer's taxable
year or recovery period or recovery method used by the taxpayer.7 The "anti-
churning" rules of ACRS8 were amended to clarify that ACRS allowances can
be applied to property received as a result of death, if the basis of the property
is determined under I.R.C. Section 1014(a), even though the property was placed
in service before 1981.1 Thus, the "anti-churning" rules apparently would deny
ACRS allowances respecting property received from a decendent (and placed
in service before 1981) if the property were appreciated property acquired by
the decedent by gift within one year prior to the decedent's death from the
person who received the property as a result of the decedent's death. This would
be the result since the basis of such property would not be "stepped-up" under
Section 1014(a).'0
B. IRA Contributions for a Spouse
A spouse having compensation who is age 70 or older is now clearly
permitted to make an IRA contribution for the benefit of a spouse having no
compensation as long as the non-earning spouse has not attained age 70 prior
to the close of the taxable year."
C. Qualified Terminable Interest Property
The Technical Corrections Act of 1982 includes a number of clarifying
provisions respecting the use of qualified terminable interest property (QTIP)
in obtaining an estate tax marital deduction.' 2 Among these is a provision speci-
fying that QTIP property included in the transferee spouse's estate pursuant
to Section 2044 is eligible for a "step-up" in basis.' 3 This is consistent with
other QTIP clarifications in the Act to the effect that an inclusion under Sec-
tion 2044 in the estate of the second spouse who dies results in the QTIP prop-
erty being treated as passing directly from that spouse for transfer tax purposes
in general, including application of the charitable transfer deduction of I.R.C.
Section 2055.' 4
D. Current Use Valuation under Section 2032A.
Among other technical changes, the current use valuation provisions of
I.R.C. Section 2032A now permit "tacking" of material participation by a
,S. REP. No. 592, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4149, 4153-54.
'I.R.C. § 168(e)(4) (1982).
9I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(H) (1982).
"I.R.C. § 1014(e) gives the donor/heir the decedent's basis as determined immediately before his death
- generally speaking a carryover basis as determined under I.R.C. Section 1015.
"I.R.C. §§ 219(d) (1982); S. REP. No. 592, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4149, 4153-54.
"See I.R.C. § § 2056(b)(7) and 2044 (1982). Respecting the role of QTIP property in the gift tax structure,
see I.R'.C. Sections 2519 and 2523. Generally, a transfer of QTIP property permits the transferor a life
income' interest while denying control over disposition of the remainder. Prior to the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 such transfers would have precluded a marital deduction for transfer tax purposes.
31.R.C. § 1014(b)(10) (1982).
'S. REP. No. 592, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4149, 4167-69.
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retired spouse with active management by the surviving spouse to obtain the
lower current use value for the surviving spouse's estate where the spouse dies
fewer than eight years after the death of the first spouse.' Thus, the number
of estates that can take advantage of current use valuation has been expanded.
E. Gifts Made within 3 Years of Decedent's Death.
For decedents dying after 1981 only a limited category of transfers made
within three years of death will result in an inclusion under I.R.C. Section 2035
in the gross estate of the transferor. For example, disposition by gift within
three years of death of a life estate retained in a manner that would have resulted
in an inclusion in the donor's gross estate had the interest been retained at death 6
will nevertheless result in an inclusion under the three year rule. ' 7 As a result
of the Technical Corrections Act of 1982, the category of such transfers no
longer includes exercises of general powers of appointment, so that such an
exercise within three years of death will not result in an inclusion in the exer-
ciser/decedent's gross estate.' 8
F. Recapture of Section 179 Deduction.
I.R.C. Section 179 allows a limited amount of property acquired for use in
a trade or business to be immediately "expensed" rather than subjected to cost
recovery allowances over a period of years under Section 168. Under the Act,
in a taxable year in which it is determined that property so expensed is no longer
used "predominantly" in a trade or business, the taxpayer must include in in-
come, the tax benefit derived from the expensing deduction. 19 The Internal
Revenue Service issued instructions to the 1983 Form 1040 that explain the IRS's
interpretation of this "recapture" provision. The instructions provide that the
amount to be added back to income is obtained by subtracting from the Sec-
tion 179 deduction previously taken the recovery allowances under Section 168
that would have been allowed on the Section 179 amount from the time the
property was placed in service until the taxable year of recapture.2"
14. Social Security Amendments of 1983
Extensive changes were made in the social security laws by the Social
Security Amendments of 1983.1 One of the most important changes occurred
"I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(5)(c) (1982).
"See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1982).
"I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (1982) specifically mentions transfers that relate to I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037, 2038, and 2042.
"Such an exercise may have gift tax consequences under I.R.C. § 2514, but the reference to I.R.C. § 2041
is now deleted from § 2035(d)(2), so that valuation of the transfer for transfer tax purposes is geared to
the date of the gift rather than the date of death.
"H.R. CONF. REP. 986, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4203,
4215-16.
"The recapture is triggered by a reduction in the business use of the subject property to 50% or less.
The addition to income is reported on Form 4797.
'Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983). Due to the extensive legislation,
only the major changes will be discussed here.
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with the change in the tax rates.2 Effective December 31, 1983,3 both employees"
and employers5 will pay Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes at
an accelerated rate.6 Although the FICA tax rates are accelerated for the years
1984 through 1989, the 1990 tax rate remains the same. At the same time, the
Social Security Amendments of 1983 allow an income tax credit for employees
against the tax increases in 1984.1
The Amendments of 1983 also increase the tax rates on self-employment
income8 in order to correct the disparity between self-employment rates and
the combined employee-employer rates.' The Social Security Amendments of
1983 also increase the hospital insurance rates for self-employment income.I°
Prior to the Social Security Amendments of 1983, social security benefits'
were not included in the taxpayer's gross income for income tax purposes. But
under the new legislation, these benefits are included in the taxpayer's gross
income up to the lesser of one-half of the benefits received, or one-half the
excess of the sum of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income 2 plus one-half of
the social security benefits received over the base amount.'3 By doing this, Con-
gress is able to tap a source of income tax that had not previously been tapped.
'Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 123, 97 Stat. 65, 87-88 (1983) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § § 3101 (a), 3111 (a)).
'1d. at § 123(a)(3).
4Id. at § 123(a)(1).
'Id. at § 123(a)(2).
'Under prior law, the employee's portion of the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) tax
was to be 5.4076 for 1984, 5.7007o for the years 1985 through 1989, and 6.200o for the years after 1989.
Under the new law, the employee's portion of the same tax will be 5.7007o for the years 1984 through
1987, 6.0606 for the years 1988 and 1989, and 6.2007o for 1990 and after. The employer's portion of the
OASDI tax is identical to the employee's portion, both before and after the 1983 legislation.
'Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 123(b), 97 Stat. 65, 88 (1983) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 3510).
'Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 124, 97 Stat. 65, 89 (1983) (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 1401(a), (b)).
'Under the prior law, the OASDI tax rate on self-employment income was 8.05% for 1981 through 1984,
8.5507o for 1985 through 1989 and 9.30% for 1990 and after. After the Amendments of 1983, the OASDI
rates for self-employment income are 11.40076 for January 1, 1984, through December 31, 1987, 12.12%
for January 1, 1988, through December 31, 1989, and 12.4007o after December 31, 1989.
_'°Under the prior law, the hospital insurance rate on self-employment income was 1.3076 for January 1,
1981, through December 31, 1984, 1.350o for January 1, 1985, through December 31, 1985, and 1.450o
for January 1, 1986 and after. The Amendments of 1983 increased the hospital insurance rates for self-
employment income to 2.70% for tax years beginning in 1984, 2.30 for the year 1985, and 2.007 for
the years 1986 through 1989.
'Here, social security benefits include any amount received under monthly benefits of OASDI or benefits
under Tier I of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974.
"This adjusted gross income is modified by I.R.C. § 86(d) (1982), by adding back any deduction taken
by a married couple for two-earner income, or any earned foreign income exclusion. Also, the taxpayer
must add all tax-exempt interest, such as the interest on municipal bonds.
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121, 97 Stat. 65, 80 (1983). The base amount
under this law is $32,000 for a married person filing a joint return; zero for a married person not filing
a joint return; and $25,000 for a single person, or a married person living apart from his or her spouse
for the entire year or filing separately.
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The Social Security Amendments of 1983 changed some of the benefits
under the social security system. The Amendments of 1983 shift the cost-of-
living increases from the middle of the year, as they had been in the past, to
the end of the year. 14 By pushing back this cost-of-living increase for six months,
it in effect provides a permanent reduction in benefits to beneficiaries and a
permanent savings to the social security system.
Before the 1983 Amendments, a qualified retiree normally collected his
or her full benefits at age 65. Under the 1983 changes, this age will gradually
be increased so that by the year 2022, the age at which a retiree can collect
his or her full benefits will be 67.'" This recent change does not affect the early
retirement age with reduced benefits, which remains at 62. Additionally, before
1983, a beneficiary or dependent under age 70 had part of his or her benefits
reduced if the beneficiary was working and earning over a specific amount.
Under the new law, a divorced spouse's benefits will not be reduced because
of the insured's excess earnings.' 6
Under prior law, a person who was eligible for a public or government
pension had to offset the benefits received on a dollar-for-dollar basis with
social security benefits. Effective as of July 1, 1983, public pensions must only
be offset up to two-thirds of their total. 7
The Social Security Amendments of 1983 provide for a liberalization of
the retirement test beginning in 1990. 8s Before the 1983 Amendments, persons
65 or older were required to offset one dollar of benefits for every two dollars
earned over the annual exempt amount. 9 The 1983 legislation changed this
offset and now a person must offset one dollar of benefits for every three dollars
earned over the annual exempt amount.20
A worker who delays retirement benefits beyond age 65 is entitled to an
increase in the old-age benefits. This is provided as an incentive to delay retire-
ment before age 65 and thereby delay benefit payments by the Social Security
Administration. In the past this increase was 3076 for each year in which the
worker between ages 65 and 72 does not receive any benefits. After 1983, a
delayed retirement credit will be gradually phased in to increase the percent-
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 11, 97 Stat. 65, 72-73 (1983) (codified as
amended at Social Security Act § 215(i)(2)(A)(ii)).
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 201, 97 Stat. 65, 107-109 (1983) (codified
as amended at Social Security Act § 216(a)).
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Publ. L. No. 98-21, § 132, 97 Stat. 65, 93-95 (1983) (codified as
amended at Social Security Act §§ 203(b)(2), (d)(1)(B), (0(7)).
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 337, 97 Stat. 65, 131-32 (1983) (codified
as amended at Social Security Act §§ 202(b)(4)(A), (c)(2)(A), (f)(2)(A), (g)(4)(A) and § 202(e)(7)(A)).
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 347, 97 Stat. 65, 138 (1983) (codified as
amended at Social Security Act § 203(f)(3)).
"Social Security Act § 203(f)(3) (1982).
"Social Security Act § 203(0(3) (1983).
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age to 3 /% by 1990.1 Additionally, the maximum increase permitted will be
extended in 2008.
The Social Security Amendments of 1983 also changes the scope of Social
Security coverage. Prior to 1984, federal employees were excluded from coverage
under the social security system. Under the 1983 Amendments, all federal
employees hired on or after January 1, 1984, will be brought into the social
securitysystem.23 In addition, the system will now include all legislative branch
employees not participating in the Civil Service Retirement System,24 all members
of Congress,25 the President,26 Vice President,27 all federal judges,28 and all
executive and senior executive political appointees. 29 Another group which had
previously been excluded from coverage under the Social Security system and
which will be covered as of 1984, is employees of nonprofit organizations.3"
Contributions by an employer to a qualified cash or deferred compensa-
tion plan defined in I.R.C. § 401(k) are also includible in the Social Security
wage base3" beginning in 1984. Includibility is limited to the extent that the
employee could have elected to receive cash in place of the contribution.3 2 The
employer's contributions to such a plan are taxable regardless of whether the
cash or deferred arrangement is part of a cafeteria plan.II Employer contribu-
tions to tax-sheltered annuities are also includible in the wage base, if made
due to a salary reduction agreement.34
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 114, 97 Stat. 65, 79 (1983) (codified as amended
at Social Security Act § 202(w)).
22Id.
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 101, 97 Stat. 65, 67-70 (1983) (codified as
amended at Social Security Act § 210 (a)).
24Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 101(a)(l), 97 Stat. 65, 68 (1983) (codified
as amended at Social Security Act § 210(a)(6)(v)).
2 Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 101(a)(l), 97 Stat. 65, 68 (1983) (codified
as amended at Social Security Act § 210(a)(6)(iv)).
21Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 101(a)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 68 (1983) (codified
as amended at Social Security Act § 210(a)(6)(i)).
2"Id.
"aSocial Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 101(a)(l), 97 Stat. 65, 68 (1983) (codified
as amended at Social Security Act § 210(a)(6)(iii)).
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 101(a)(l), 97 Stat. 65, 68 (1983) (codified
as amended at Social Security Act §§ 210(a)(6)(ii) & (iii)).
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 102, 97 Stat. 65, 70-71 (1983) (codified as
amended at Social Security Act § 210(a)(8)).
"The social security wage base is the maximum amount of wages that the social security system uses to
determine FICA taxes.
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 324, 97 Stat. 65, 122-126 (1983). See also
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 146, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 404,
436.
1H.R. CONF. REP. No. 47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 147, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
404, 437. Cafeteria plans are fringe benefit plans which allow an employee to select certain fringe benefits
up to a certain dollar amount, in addition to a basic fringe benefit plan.
14Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 324, 97 Stat. 65, 122-126 (1983).
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15. Multiple Trusts Regulations
Treasury Regulation Section 1.641(a) - 0(c) provides that multiple trusts
will be consolidated and treated as one trust for the purposes of subchapter
J, if the trusts have no substantially independent purposes,' have the same
grantor and substantially the same beneficiary,2 and if the avoidance or mitiga-
tion of taxes was the principal purpose.' However, in a recent Tax Court deci-
sion, Edward L. Stephenson Trust v. Commissioner,4 the Tax Court held this
regulation invalid.
Stephenson involved two cases, both concerning the consolidation of two
trusts by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In this case
the simple trusts held shares of high grade equities and all the income was
distributed currently. The second trust was an accumulation trust 6 that held,
distributions received from the simple trust as well as accumulations of its own.
During the years in question, the simple trust distributed most of its income
to the accumulation trust and each trust filed a separate return. Using Treasury
Regulation Section 1.641 (a) - 0(c), the Internal Revenue Service consolidated
both of the trusts into one, thereby increasing the total tax.
In Stephenson, the Tax Court gave judgment for the taxpayers, holding
Treasury Regulation Section 1.641(a) - 0(c) invalid. In keeping with their decision
in Estelle Morris Trust v. Commissioner,7 the court found that multiple trusts
were separate taxable entities regardless of a tax avoidance purpose. In the Estelle
Morris Trust decision, the Tax Court had rejected the consolidation of trusts
approach advanced by the Internal Revenue Service and allowed multiple trust
to be taxed separately.
In the Tax Reform act of 1969,1 Congress eliminated some of the tax
benefits associated with multiple trusts9 without altering the status of multiple
trusts as separate taxable entities by eliminating the five-year limitation and
all exceptions to the throwback rule.'0 In 1972, the consolidation regulation"
'Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(c)(1), T.D. 7204, 1972-2 C.B. 352, 393 (1972).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(c)(2), T.D. 7204, 1972-2 C.B. 352, 393 (1972).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(c)(2), T.D. 7204, 1972-2 C.B. 352, 393-394 (1972).
'8l T.C. 283 (1983).
'1.R.C. § 651 (1982) explains what qualifies as a simple trust. Basically, simple trusts are trusts whose
income is currently distributed.
'I.R.C. § 661 (1982) explains what qualifies as an accumulation trust. Basically, accumulation trusts are
trusts whose current income is accumulated and added to the corpus instead of being currently distributed.
'51 T.C. 20 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1970).
'Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
'Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 331, 665-669, 83 Stat. 487, 592-599 (1969).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.665(a)-0A(a)(3), T.D. 7204, 1972-2 C.B. 352, 355 (1972). Under the throwback rule,
an accumulation trust's eventual distribution of accumulated income will be taxed to the beneficiary as
if it had been currently distributed to the beneficiary.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(c), T.D. 7204, 1972-2 C.B. 352, 393-394 (1972).
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was promulgated as part of the regulations interpreting the 1969 Act.' 2
The Commissioner used the reenactment doctrine by arguing'3 in Stephen-
son that Congress approved the consolidation regulation, since it did not overrule
the regulation in its consideration of multiple trusts under the Tax Reform Act
of 1976. 4 The Tax Court held that the reenactment doctrine did not apply to
the consolidation regulation because the 1976 Act added the so-called "Third
Trust Rule" with I.R.C. Section 667(c), which provided a method for eliminating
abuses of multiple trusts inconsistent with consolidating multiple trusts under
the regulation. Thus the Court held that the consolidation regulation, Treasury
Regulation Section 1.641(a) - 0(c) of the income tax regulations, added restric-
tions not contemplated by Congress and was therefore invalid.
Because of the progressive tax rates under which trusts are taxed, if trust
income is split between two or more trusts instead of one, the tax from each
would be less than if all were consolidated and taxed as one. For example,
assume that a trust has annual taxable trust income of $35,000 which is not
distributed currently. 5 If this income was taxed in one trust, the resulting tax
would be $11,398.6 But if this same taxable trust income was divided between
two trusts, the tax bill would be $3137 for each, for a total of $7330.17 This
disparity is of course due to the use of progressive tax tables and obviously
serves as a tax planning device.
The I.R.S. has not acquiesced to Stephenson. Therefore it is likely that
even though the Tax Court states that multiple trusts are separate entities for
tax purposes, the I.R.S. will continue to contest most multiple trust ar-
rangements. Additionally, recently proposed legislation'" seems to accept the
I.R.S. position. Therefore it is likely that in the future, multiple trusts that
have the same grantor and beneficiary, no substantially independent purpose,
and tax avoidance as a principal purpose, will be consolidated and taxed as
one entity. Thus, the future use of multiple trusts as a tax planning device may
be of limited utility.
.2T.D. 7204, 1972-2 C.B. 352 (1972).
"Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
4Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
'This is an example of an accumulation trust in Which income is accumulated and not distributed when
earned.
"This is a simplified example used to illustrate the possible tax advantages of multiple-trusts, not taking
into consideration credits or deductions against the tax under I.R.C. § 642.
'17Trust income of $35,000 would be taxed at a 42% marginal tax rate while trust income of $17,500 for
two trusts would be taxed at a 33% marginal tax rate.
"The proposed legislation is out of the Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee
and at the time of this printing is under consideration by the Conference Committee. The House version
of the bill is referred to as the Tax Reform Act of 1984, while the Senate version is called the Deficit
Reduction Tax Bill of 1984. Both contain legislation in each Act respectively at Section 82 to codify Treas.
Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(c)(1) (1972) at I.R.C. § 643.
Editor's Note: The Tax Reform Act of 1984 was signed into law by President Reagan on July 18, 1984.
Section 82 of this Act codified the Treasury Regulations as mentioned above into law, thus negating the
Tax Court's precedent in the Stephenson case.
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16. Temporary Regulations - S Corporations
The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982' made numerous changes in rules
affecting Sub S corporations. Some of these changes are explained in recently
issued temporary regulations. Basically, the regulations clarify the election, ter-
mination of status, and taxable year features of S corporations.
Election
To make an S corporation election, an authorized person2 must sign and
file the appropriate form.' Each shareholder's consent to the election must ap-
pear on or be attached to the form. If a separate statement is used to show
consent, it must include the name, address, and taxpayer identification number
of the corporation and shareholder. The number of shares owned and the stock
acquisition date or dates must also be included.'
For a proper election to be made, the shareholder's consent must be given
at the time the election is made.' In addition, consent must also be given by
anyone who was a shareholder at any time during the taxable year prior to
the election, but who was not a shareholder at the time of the election, if the
election is made within the corporation's first taxable year for which it is
effective. 6 Special rules apply to consent involving stock ownership by com-
munity property spouses, minors, trusts, and estates.7
The time for filing the election must be either during the immediately
preceding tax year for which the election is to be effective or before the six-
teenth day of the third month during the taxable year for which the election
is to be effective.' Under prior law the election could be made either during
the preceding tax year or during the first seventy-five days of the taxable year
for which the election was to be effective. 9 Certain late or otherwise defective
elections will be treated as being made for the next taxable year. Io
Requirements for a qualified Subchapter S trust election are slightly dif-
ferent. A trust election must be filed either within sixty-one days from the date
a corporation's stock is transferred to a trust or during the first sixty-one days
of the taxable year in which the election is to be effective, whichever is later."
'Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
'Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-1(a) (1983) (providing that for purposes of an S corporation election, an authorized
person is any person who is authorized to sign the return required to be filed under Section 6037).
'Id. (Form 2553).
'Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-2(a) (1983).
'However, Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-2(c) (1983) provides an extension of time for filing consents.
'Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-2(b)(1) (1983).
'Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-2(b)(2) (1983).
'Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-1(b) (1983).
'I.R.C. § 1372(c) (1982).
'Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-1(b) (1983).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1361-1(a)(4) (1983).
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The commissioner's consent is required to revoke this type of election.' 2 For
successive income beneficiaries, the election will be automatic unless an affirm-
ative refusal to consent is made. 3
Termination
Revocation of S corporation status can only be made when shareholders
holding a majority of all issued and outstanding stock consent to such
revocation.'" The corporation must file a revocation statement which must be
signed by an authorized person. In addition, a statement of consent to the
revocation signed by each consenting shareholder must be attached to the cor-
porate revocation statement. 'I Under prior law, the consent of all shareholders
was required to revoke S corporation status.'6
For the termination year, the corporation can elect to avoid a Section
1362(3)(2) pro rata allocation (of short taxable year items) if everyone who
was a shareholder at anytime during the corporation's termination year so con-
sents. An election statement must be filed and must state the cause and date
of termination. Shareholder consent statements must be attached to the elec-
tion statements. '
The temporary regulations provide a new termination option not previously
available. If a shareholder terminates his entire interest in an S corporation,
the corporation can elect to treat the taxable year as two short taxable years. II
By electing to treat part of the taxable year as an S short year and the other
part as a C short year, the corporation can initiate a pro rata distribution as
of the day the shareholder terminates his interest."' Once again, all persons
who were shareholders at any time during the taxable year must consent. A
statement of consent, signed by the shareholders, must be attached to the elec-
tion statement to be filed by the corporation.2"
Taxable Year
Under prior law, a Subchapter S corporation could choose any account-
ing year that a regular corporation could choose. However, under the new
temporary regulations only a calendar year can be used as the taxable year unless
a corporation can establish a business purpose for having a different taxable
'Temp. Reg. § 18.1361-1(c) (1983).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1361-1(b) (1983).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-3 (1983).
"ld. The statement of consent must also include the number of issued and outstanding shares of stock
held by each consent shareholder at the time the revocation is made.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(2) (1976).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-4 (1983).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1377-1 (1983).
"A pro rata distribution is permitted by Section 1377(a)(1).
"Temp. Reg. ,§ 18.1377-1 (1983). The election statement choosing the treatment of the taxable year as
two short tax years must also include the manner and date of termination.
[Vol. 2
32
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol3/iss1/1
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1983
year. 1 Thus, a corporation cannot elect S corporation status unless its taxable
year is a calendar year or it has established a business purpose for using a dif-
ferent taxable year.
A corporation considering electing S corporation status may qualify for
an automatic change of its taxable year. To qualify, all principal shareholders22
must have as their taxable year a calendar year or must concurrently change
their taxable year to a calendar year.23 If this qualification is met, a corpora-
tion's taxable year will be automatically changed to a calendar year upon the
filing of an S corporation election."
The procedure is more complicated for electing corporations that want
to either retain a fiscal taxable year or adopt a fiscal taxable year. The cor-
poration must establish a business purpose 5 for a fiscal taxable year and receive
the commissioner's approval to use such a taxable year. The corporation must
request a fiscal tax year on their election to become an S corporation.2 6 If the
request for the fiscal tax year is denied, the S corporation election will be inef-
fective unless the fiscal year request is accompanied by an alternative request
for adoption of a calendar year if the fiscal year is denied or the Commissioner
waives the requirement to file an alternate request.27 If either of these two ex-
ceptions are applied, S corporation status will not be denied despite the fact
that the request for a fiscal taxable year was denied. Consequently, to avoid
possible delay in achieving S corporation status, corporations wishing reten-
tion or adoption of fiscal taxable year should include the additional request
with the fiscal year request when filing an S corporation election.
17. Final Regulations on Group-Term Life Insurance
On December 1, 1983, final regulations were approved which revise the
uniform premium tables used to calculate the cost for tax purposes of group-
term life insurance provided by an employer to an employee. Pursuant to In-
ternal Revenue Code Section 79(a)' an employee must include in gross income
that portion of the cost of group-term life insurance to the extent that the cost
exceeds the cost of $50,000 of group-term life insurance and any amount paid
by the employee for the insurance. These revised tables are used to calculate
the amount of premium cost to be included in an employee's gross income.
"Temp. Reg; § 18.1378-1(a) (1983).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-1(b)(1) (1983) provides that a principal shareholder is a shareholder having 5%
or more of the issued and outstanding stock of the corporation.
"Id. (however, a shareholder must first secure approval from the commissioner before changing his taxable
year).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-1(b)(2) (1983).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-1(a) (1983) (a business purpose will be satisfied if it comes within the meaning
of Reg. § 1.442-1(b)(1)).
6Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-1(b)(2)(ii) (1983) (the request must be made on Form 2553 which is the form used
to elect S corporation status, see note 3 and accompanying text, supra).
"Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-1(b)(2)(ii)(A), (B) (1983).
'I.R.C. § 79 (1982).
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The Treasury recognized the need to update the regulations since the ex-
isting uniform premium table was based upon outdated mortality experience.
Treasury Decision 79242 sets forth the criteria upon which the Treasury relied
in drafting the regulations. This criteria was established by accumulating all
comments made to proposed regulations previously submitted and incorporating
those deemed noteworthy into the final regulations.
The revised uniform premium tables maintain the existing five-year age
brackets of the previous regulations. The revised uniform tables also maintain
the general form of the previous tables. The cost per $1,000 of protection for
a one-month period for the under age 30 bracket remains the same. All other
age bracket amounts have been significantly reduced, especially those amounts
to be used for older taxpayers.
The new uniform premium tables were based upon several assumptions.
These assumptions are subject to change as more accurate information is ac-
cumulated. The Treasury has recognized that the tables may not reflect actual
insurance costs but feels that the new tables reflect actual cost more accurately
than did the previous tables.
The first assumption upon which the new tables are based is the most re-
cent mortality experience published by the Society of Actuaries (1975-1979 ex-
perience). These actuarial experiences were updated to 1982 by extrapolation
based upon past improvement in mortality experience. The Society of Actuaries
has agreed to consider publishing mortality experience more often, thus pro-
viding current figures and making extrapolation unnecessary.3
The second assumption upon which the revised tables are based is a gender
mix consisting of 85 percent male and 15 percent female employees. No com-
ments were received to the effect that the proposed gender mix as such was
inappropriate for employees receiving group-term life insurance coverage in
excess of $50,000."
The final assumption made was a 10.5 percent loading charge. The loading
charge is a charge made in addition to mortality costs and is deemed to be
equal to 10.5 percent of mortality costs. This 10.5 percent figure was retained
from the former regulations, since the Internal Revenue Service was unable
2T.D. 7924, 48 Fed. Reg. 54594 (1983).
3Id.
41d.
[Vol. 2
34
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol3/iss1/1
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1983
to compile data sufficient to support a new percentage.5
The revised uniform premium tables are to remain in effect until the Ser-
vice accumulates sufficient data to adjust its assumptions. The tables should
be used for insurance provided for December 31, 1982. Because the cost per
$1,000 of protection for a one-month period has generally been reduced, the
amount of group-term insurance cost includable in an employee's gross income
will be correspondingly reduced. This will result in a substantial tax savings
for older taxpayers who are employees receiving group-term life insurance in
excess of $50,000. The employer will not be affected by any changes in these
tables, since the employer's deduction is based upon the amount of premiums
paid and as such is not affected by the amount includable in an employee's
gross income.
18. Section 83 Regulations Upheld
In the case of Tilford v. Commissioner,I the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed a Tax Court decision' invalidating certain Code Section 83
regulations.3 The regulations treat transfers of property by a shareholder to
a corporate employee in exchange for services performed for the corporation,
as a contribution of capital by the shareholder followed by an immediate transfer
of the property from the corporation to the corporate employee as
compensation.' The question presented in Tilford was whether the shareholder
can claim capital loss deductions for the transfer of such property to corporate
employees.
Tilford was the sole shareholder and principal officer of a corporation
that manufactured and sold magnetic business signs. In an effort to motivate
the employees of the corporation, Tilford sold a portion of his stock to the
employees at a price significantly below market value, retaining the right of
first refusal to repurchase the stock at book value if the employees left the
corporation. As a result of this transaction, Tilford claimed personal deduc-
tions for the loss upon the sale of the stock.5 The Internal Revenue Service
disallowed the deductions, treating them as transfers of property in considera-
tion for the performance of services and thus contributions of capital.6
The Tax Court disagreed with the Service and permitted Tilford to claim
'Id.
'705 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1983).
2Tilford v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 134 (1980).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d) (1978) (pertaining to certain transfers by shareholders. However, at the time of
the trial and briefing in the Tax Court, the relevant regulations were published in proposed form but were
later finalized prior to the writing of the Tax Court opinion.)
4Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d)(1) (1978).
'I.R.C. § 1002 (providing for recognition of gain or loss upon the sale or exchange of property, repealed
1976).
'705 F.2d at 829.
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the loss deductions.' In invalidating the relevant regulations as outside the scope
of Section 83,8 the Tax Court maintained that Section 83 dealt primarily with
the "recognition of income under certain restricted stock compensation plans." 9
To strengthen their invalidation, the Tax Court also asserted that the regula-
tions in question were "contrary to the express terms of the Code."'"
The Court of Appeals in reversing the Tax Court's decision relied on the
broad principle that "payments made by a stockholder for the benefit of his
corporation are not deductible by the stockholder." 1' Reiterating from the Tax
Court dissent,' 2 the Court' of Appeals reasoned that the legislative purpose of
Section 83 was to provide broad coverage of compensatory sales of property
rather than limiting the scope of coverage to restricted stock compensation
plans.' 3 The Court points out that Congress would not have described the deduc-
tion recipient as "the person for whom were performed the services" if they
had meant merely to cover a bargain sale by an employer to an employee.'
Thus, the scope of Section 83 did not preclude the inclusion of the relevant
regulations.
In interpreting Section 83, the Tilford transaction could be viewed as one
of two types. It could be viewed as a simple sale in which the shareholder sells
his stock directly to the corporate employee'5 or as a transfer of stock to the
corporation then a subsequent transfer from the corporation to the employee. 6
The Court rejected the simple sale view and held that the sale must be con-
sidered a contribution to the capital of the corporation and subsequently as
compensation paid out to the employees.' 7 As a result of this view, the cor-
poration would be able to claim a deduction for its deemed payment of
compensation,' 8 and the employees must claim the received compensation as
income.' In addition, the shareholder cannot claim a loss deduction.
775 T.C. 134.
'Id. at 145.
'Id. at 144.
"Id. at 145.
"705 F.2d at 830.
12705 F.2d 828 (The Court relied heavily on the dissenting opinion of Judge Simpson).
"Id. at 830. (The Court looked at § 83(a), which sets forth the general rule of taxability for property
transferred in connection with performance of services).
"Id. (citation omitted).
"Id. at 830-831.
"Id. at 831.
"Id.
"I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982) provides for a deduction to a corporation (or individual) for "reasonable
compensation for personal services actually rendered."
"I.R.C. § 61(a)(l) (1982) provides that compensation received for services whether paid in cash or in kind
must be stated as income.
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19. New Regulations Revise Actuarial Tables and Interest Factors
In 1983, the Internal Revenue Service issued proposed amendments to the
tax regulations that contain actuarial and valuation tables, which are now based
upon a ten percent discount and income factor rather than the previously existing
six percent factor. The proposed regulations' are also gender neutral in that
they present tables based upon unisex mortality rates.2 The Service has stated
that it will periodically re-examine market interest rates and revise the tables
to reflect changing rates as the need arises.
These amendments will affect existing regulations to income tax I.R.C.
Sections 52, 170, 642 and 664; regulations under estate tax I.R.C. Sections 2031
and 2055; regulations under gift tax I.R.C. Sections 2512, 2522 and 2523; and
the temporary income tax regulations under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 under I.R.C. Section 414. Thus, these amended regula-
tions will have far reaching effects in many areas of tax practice. These effects
can be readily observed by comparing the tax consequences resulting from use
of the current six percent tables and the proposed ten percent tables. The new
tables will result in higher values being placed on life and term interests. Re-
mainders, reversions, and annuities will have lower values.
In May of 1984, the revised actuarial tables were adopted as final regula-
tions and are generally effective for transfers occurring after November 30,
1983.1 Transitional rules allowing use of rates less than 10%70 were also adopted
respecting pooled income funds and certain testamentary trusts.
20. Backup Withholding Legislation
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (hereinafter TEFRA)
set forth provisions for mandatory withholding of income tax at a ten percent
rate on interest, dividends, and patronage dividends paid or credited after June
30, 1983, to individuals and unincorporated entities.I If a payee failed to fur-
nish a taxpayer identification number (hereinafter "TIN") to the payor, or
the payor had been notified by the Internal Revenue Service that the TIN pro-
vided by the payee was incorrect, TEFRA allowed for backup withholding at
a rate of fifteen percent.
In response to the enormously unfavorable reaction of taxpayers, Con-
gress repealed these mandatory withholding provisions in the Interest and Divi-
'48 Fed. Reg. 50087 (1983).
'Making the tables gender-neutral is consistent with recent case law that restricts the use of sex-based actuarial
factors in various contexts. See Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris. 103 S.Ct. 3492 (1983). discussed
in Part I of this article; and note Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. U.S., 52 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H)
1 148,611, in which the Court found the application of gender-based tables to be unconstitutional in valuing
a reversionary interest under Section 2037.
3T.D. 7955, 1984-23 I.R.B. 4.
'Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
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dend Tax Compliance Act of 19832 and inserted a new backup withholding
system.3 The new withholding system will apply to all "reportable payments""
made after December 31, 1983. Reportable payments are defined to include
any reportable interest or dividend payments.5
Under the new law, a payor is required to deduct and withhold income
tax from a reportable payment at a rate of twenty percent if:
(1) the payee does not furnish his TIN to the payor in the manner
required;6
(2) the Secretary notifies the payor that the TIN the payee furnished
is incorrect;7
(3) there has been a notified payee underreporting as described in I.R.C.
Section 3406(c);' or
(4) there has been a payee certification failure as described in I.R.C.
Section 3406(d). 9
Section 3406 provides three general exceptions to the application of its
backup withholding provisions:" 1) payments to organizations and govern-
mental units as defined in Section 6049 (b)(4)(B), (C), (D), (E), or (F) and other
persons as specified in the regulations;1 ' 2) amounts for which withholding is
otherwise required;' 2 and 3) those persons awaiting the receipt of a TIN. 3
Section 3406 also provides for confidentiality of information obtained by
payors about payees.' 4 Specifically, the information may not be used for any
purpose other than meeting the requirements of Section 3046 as for purposes
allowed in Section 6103. ."
The Internal Revenue Service has issued temporary regulations regarding
backup withholding in the form of questions and answers. 6 These regulations
principally concern the due diligence exception to the penalty on payors of
reportable interest or dividend payments for failure to provide the payee's correct
'Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983).
31.R.C. § 3406 (1982).
41.R.C. § 3406(b)(1) (1982).
'I.R.C. § 3406(b)(2) (1982).
'I.R.C. § 3406(a)(1)(A) (1982).
'I.R.C. § 3406(a)(1)(B) (1982).
'I.R.C. § 3406(a)(1)(C) (1982).
II.R.C. § 3406(c)(1)(D) (1982).
1*I.R.C. § 3406(g) (1982).
"I.R.C. § 3406(g)(1)(A) and (B) (1982).
111.R.C. § 3406(g)(2) (1982).
"I.R.C. § 3406(g)(3) (1982).
"I.R.C. § 3406(f) (1982).
"Id. Section 6103 is entitled, "Confidentiality and Disclosure of Returns and Return Information."
16Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-1 (1983).
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taxpayer identification number on certain information returns or comply with
the certification requirements in connection with backup withholding under
the Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983.
The Internal Revenue Service has also issued Form W-9, Payor's Request
for Taxpayer Identification Number, to assist payors in obtaining correct TINs
from the taxpayer. For accounts opened before 1984, the form is used to ob-
tain the certification by the payee that his TIN is correct. For accounts opened
after 1984, the form is used to obtain the payee's certification that his TIN
is correct and that he is not subject to backup withholding.
21. Amended Regulations for Return Filing Extensions
Regulations relating to automatic extensions for filing tax returns were
recently amended for both corporate and individual taxpayers.' The corporate
extension period, formerly three months is now six months, and the individual
extension period, formerly two months, is now four months.' These changes
are effective for taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1982.1
The amended regulations provide similar requirements for corporations
and individuals respecting application for an extension. A corporate extension
is sought by filing an "Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File
U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return," which is Form 7004." Similarly, an in-
dividual files a Form 4686, labeled "Application for Automatic Extension of
Time to File U.S. Individual Tax Return."' Both the corporate and individual
forms must be signed. In the case of an individual, the form can be signed
by either the individual taxpayer or a person authorized by the individual to
act on his behalf.6 The corporate extension must be signed by a person who
is authorized by the corporation to request such an extension.7
The amended regulations require that the corporate and individual exten-
sion forms be filed with the same Internal Revenue Service office with which
taxpayers are required to file their income tax returns.' The extension form
must be filed on or before the due date for filing the income tax return.9 The
form must indicate the amount of tax properly estimated for the period and
payment for such must be remitted with the extension application.'" Accord-
ingly, the automatic extension extends only the time for filing the taxpayer's
-T.D. 7885, 1983-1 C.B. 338.
2Id.
3Id.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-3(a)(1) (1978).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-4(a)(2) (1978).
6Id.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-3(a)(1) (1978).
'Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6081-3(a)(2) and 1.6081-4(a)(3) (1978).
'Id.
"Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6081-3(a)(3) and 1.6081-4(a)(4) (1978).
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income tax return and does not extend the time period for paying the tax that
is estimated to be due.
The amended regulations also provide an automatic six month filing ex-
tension for certain United States citizens traveling or living outside of the United
States or Puerto Rico.1 Persons eligible under this provision are defined in
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6081-4.
A statement must be attached to the return verifying that the person for
whom the return is made is a person described under the regulations.1I An im-
portant distinction between this provision and the provisions applicable to per-
sons who do not venture abroad is that this provision also extends the time
for payment of taxes.13
IV. INCOME RECOGNITION AND RELATED Topics
22. Partial Recourse Notes - Determination of Basis
Prior to Revenue Ruling 82-224,1 guidelines were uncertain as to what por-
tion of a partial recourse note would be considered as basis for purposes of
depreciation and investment credit allowances for property acquired by an in-
vestor. Generally, basis in acquired property will be its cost.2 However, this
may not be true, if an investor acquires property secured by a partial recourse
note in which payments on the note are first applied to the recourse portion
and in the event of default, the collateral securing the note is also first applied
to the recourse portion. In such situations, the partial recourse note will be
treated as two separate obligations.' One will be considered recourse, the other
non-recourse.
Unless the investor can demonstrate that the fair market value of the prop-
erty securing the note is of sufficient value to support both the recourse and
non-recourse obligations, the portion treated as a non-recourse obligation will
not be considered in determining the investor's basis in the acquired property.'
In addition, the entire portion of the partial recourse note deemed to be the
recourse obligation may not be considered in determining basis if part of the
recourse obligation is treated as unstated interest and not as principal. If this
is the case, then only the present value' of the recourse obligation will be con-
sidered in determining basis.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-2(a) (1980).
121d.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-1(a) (1979).
'Rev. Rul. 82-224, 1982-2 C.B. 5.
21.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
3Rev. Rul. 82-224, 1982-2 C.B. 5.
'Id. at 7.
'See I.R.C. § 483(a) (1982) in which unstated interest is recognized for tax purposes.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(g) (1981).
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23. Preferred Stock Recapitalizations - Valuation of Preferred Stock
During the past decade, one of the most serious impediments in passing
ownership of a closely-held corporation from the older to the younger genera-
tion has been the devastating effects of inflation and the growth of the com-
pany upon estate taxes. In an attempt to solve this problem, estate planners
have engaged in "estate freezing" techniques. In the broadest interpretation,
an estate or asset freeze includes any transaction whereby the older generation
owns assets with a fixed value which will remain constant over the remainder
of their lives, while the younger generation possesses an interest in the business
which receives all or most future appreciation. It should be noted that although
the older generation is interested in diverting the future growth of the business
to the younger generation, the older generation usually does not want to relin-
quish control.
Historically, one of the most popular techniques to achieve these goals
is a corporate recapitalization. The recapitalization involves conversion of the
older generation's common stock into preferred voting or preferred nonvoting
stock. The older generation then retains the preferred voting stock and gives
the preferred non-voting stock to children not involved in the business. The
remaining common stock is owned by the children working in the business.
The common stock owned by the children working in the business receives
the benefits of future appreciation. Although the common stock has voting
rights, the number of shares may be substantially less than the number of pre-
ferred voting shares held by the parents. Therefore, the older generation is
assured of the control of the corporation until such time as they choose to relin-
quish it. In 1983 the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 83-120,'
which deals with the valuation of preferred and common stock resulting from
a corporate recapitalization. Although the Revenue Ruling is structured to deal
with the valuatioh of a gift that might occur at the time of the recapitaliza-
tion, the elements determining value have equal applicability for other tax
purposes.
The asset value freezing techniques recognize that stock ownership is, in
reality, a bundle of legal rights and that each right can be valued and transferred
within a family unit, ideally with minimal gift, estate, and income tax ramifica-
tions. These rights are:
1. Income - the right to the present and future income produced by
the entity.
2. Present equity - the right to the current fair market value of the stock
or the current net worth of the business on liquidation.
3. Future appreciation - the right to the speculative possibility of growth
in the value of the business.
'Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170.
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4. Control - the right to vote in the management of the business and
the activities associated with it.
The factors set forth by Revenue Ruling 83-120, which amplifies Revenue
Ruling 59-60, for determining the value of preferred and common stock, will
normally result in the preferred stock having a fair market value substantially
less than its par value. The corollary of this result is that the common stock
will have a value substantially greater than would normally be expected. As
a result, when the common stock is passed to the younger generation, a tax-
able gift may result.
The most important factor in determining the value of preferred stock
is the adequacy of the dividend.I If the actual fair market value of the preferred
stock is to be equal with the par value, then the dividend that the closely-held
company is paying must be comparable with dividends paid on high-grade
publicly traded preferred stock. If the closely-held corporation is required to
pay an interest rate on borrowings in excess of the prime rate, then Revenue
Ruling 83-120 suggests that the same premium be added to the dividend rate
paid on its preferred stock. If the yield on the preferred stock does not pass
this comparability test, then the true value of the preferred stock will be substan-
tially less than the par value.
Although the dividend rate actually stated is assumed to be the yield on
the preferred stock, an examination must be made into the adequacy of the
company's earnings to determine whether the company will be able to pay such
a rate. Dividend coverage is determined "by the ratio of the sum of pre-tax
and pre-interest earnings to the sum of the total interest to be paid and the
pre-tax earnings needed to pay the after-tax dividends." 3
It is important that the company not only have the earnings capacity, but
also the intention to pay the stated dividend rate. Past earnings will be analyzed
to see if on a historical basis there is adequate coverage for the stated dividends.
If the stock is cumulative, the value of the preferred stock will be enhanced.
Typically, a non-cumulative provision will be included in the preferred stock,
since any unpaid dividends are subject to estate tax at the death of the preferred
stockholder.
Another aspect of the valuation is whether the corporation will be able
to pay the full liquidation preference at the time of liquidation.4 This can be
measured by the amount of the corporation's net assets. As with the dividend
rate, the coverage of net assets for liquidation is also to be compared to that
of high quality, publicly traded preferred stock. If the asset protection is in-
adequate, the value of the preferred stock is less than its par value.
21d.
3Id.
Id.
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The ability to vote the preferred stock and thus maintain control of course
enhances its value.' Although the preferred stock may have voting control, if
the state law provides special protection for common shareholders, the value
of the common stock may be enhanced as well.
The Revenue Ruling points out that the value of common stock is deter-
mined in relation to the various rights it possesses.' If the common stock is
to be the beneficiary of all future earnings, then it has a substantial value. The
extent of this valuable right is determined by the company's past growth ex-
perience, the industry's economic, condition, and the general economic condi-
tions of the country. If at the time of the recapitalization the company has
earnings in excess of the preferred dividend coverage, the common stock becomes
more valuable. This is particularly true if the company has a history of
reinvesting its earnings rather than paying them out as dividends.
Revenue Ruling 83-120 will cause tax and estate planners to seriously ques-
tion the commonly used technique of stating a high dividend rate on preferred
stock and then paying a rate substantially less or no dividend at all. The result
of violating the principles set forth in this revenue ruling will have an immediate
tax result, since the recapitalization will result in a gift to the common
shareholders by the amount that the par value of the preferred stock exceeds
its actual fair market value.
This revenue ruling may result in increased interest in the "partnership
freeze" technique. A partnership technique may be preferred because the return
paid to the frozen "preferred" interest is not subject to double taxation as are
the dividends paid to preferred shareholders. In all probability, very few closely-
held corporations will be able to pay the high dividends that Revenue Ruling
83-120 requires.
24. Preferred Stock Recapitalizations - Excess Redemption Premium
Revenue Ruling 83-1191 provides that, where there is a provision for the
redemption of preferred stock received in a recapitalization at the death of the
holder of the preferred stock, any redemption premium in excess of 10% of
the initial fair market value of the preferred stock is ordinary income. This
income is treated as constructively received pro rata over the shareholder's life
expectancy.
A recapitalization is an arrangement whereby a corporation's capital struc-
ture is realigned to accomplish certain objectives. If the readjustment qualifies
as a recapitalization within the meaning of Section 368(a)(1)(E), no gain or loss
occurs if the principal amount of securitites received does not exceed the amount
'Id.
6id.
'Rev. Rul. 83-119, 1983-2 C.B. 57.
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of securities surrendered. 2 Any excess stock distribution could result in the
realization of income to the shareholder. However, gross income does not
generally include stock distributions unless one of the Section 305(b) or (c) ex-
ceptions apply.'
The following example of a recapitalization, taken from Revenue Ruling
83-119, enables a better understanding of the events and motives for this type
of reorganization. Domestic corporation "X" has outstanding 100 shares of
common stock. "A" owns 80 shares of this common stock and is the presi-
dent of the corporation. "B", the son of A, and the person who will be taking
over the management of the company, owns the remaining 20 shares. A's ob-
jectives are to retire from any future involvement in X and to transfer control
to his son. Pursuant to a recapitalization plan, a single class of $1,000 par value,
non-voting preferred stock is authorized. The plan requires that upon A's death
the company has to redeem the preferred stock at its par value, $1000, from
A's estate. A exchanges his 80 shares of common stock, which have a value
of $1,000, for 80 shares of new preferred. After the exchange, B is in control
since he owns all of the common voting shares of the company.'
Both A and B presume the recapitalization to be a tax-free, one-for-one
exchange based on the premise that 80 shares of $1,000 fair market value com-
mon were exchanged for 80 shares of $1,000 par value preferred stock. However,
at the time of the recapitalization, the preferred stock only has a fair market
value of $600 per share. The result of the exchange is that at A's death, X
corporation will redeem the preferred stock in an amount in excess of its issue
price.I
The general rule of Section 305(a) is that no income results from a
recapitalization. Distributions of preferred stock however, are an exception.
Preferred stock distributions that increase a shareholder's proportionate in-
terest in the earnings or assets of the corporation are considered a distribution
of property. Such a distribution occurs when preferred stock is redeemed after
a specific period of time at a price higher than the issue price of the preferred
stock. 6 Nevertheless, not all of the excess redemption amount will be a distribu-
tion of property because a redemption premium is permitted if reasonable. A
redemption premium is "reasonable" if it is in the nature of a penalty for a
premature redemption of the preferred stock and if such premium does not
exceed the amount the corporation would be required to pay for the rights to
make a premature redemption under market conditions existing at the time
of issuance. 7 A redemption premium safe harbor exists if the redemption
'1.R.C. § 354 (1982).
'I.R.C. § 305(a) (1982).
'Rev. Rul. 83-119, 1983-2 C.B. 57.
5Id.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b)(1) (1974).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b)(2) (1974).
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premium does not exceed ten percent of the issue price of stock not redeemable
for five years from the date of issuance.'
Recapitalizations are only taxable if a distribution is deemed to occur. Cer-
tain transactions are deemed to be distributions under Section 305(c). These
deemed distributions may even occur in isolated transactions, if the transaction
is pursuant to a plan to increase a shareholder's proportionate interest
periodically.' This "plan" is not found in our example. The only "plan" in
corporation X was to transfer corporate control.
Although the recapitalization itself is not part of a plan to increase a
shareholder's proportionate interest, other factors may cause the transfer to
become a taxable distribution of property. In our example these factors are
the difference in issue price and redemption price and the fact that the stock
cannot be redeemed until a specific date. During the period in which the
preferred stock is not redeemable, A's interest is being slowly increased and
thus such increase causes the "deemed distribution". Note, however, that a
"deemed distribution" does not exist when the excess between issue price and
redemption price is a reasonable redemption premium."
The "deemed distribution" will be considered constructively received by
A during the period between issuance and redemption. The amount of distribu-
tion is the amount by which the redemption price exceeds the issue price plus
the ten percent safe harbor redemption premium. This amount will be includ-
ed in A's income ratably, using A's life expectancy at the specific redemption
date. If A dies earlier, distribution income will be considered constructively
received at death."I Therefore, there is income of $340 ($1000 - $660) over 24
years, using A's assumed age, at $14.17 per year.
This "deemed" distribution could have been avoided had a true one-for-
one exchange transpired, that is, if the total fair market value of the newly
authorized and issued preferred stock had been given in exchange for an equal
amount of the surrendered common stock. Respecting a related problem,
Revenue Ruling 83-12011 provides factors that should be considered when valuing
stock.
25. Stock Sale Income Deferral Through Use of Escrow Arrangement
Reed v. Commissioner' reverses a Tax Court decision that upheld a defi-
ciency based upon the taxpayer's attempt to defer recognition of income. The
sId.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c) (1973).
'Rev. Rul. 83-119, 1983-2 C.B. 57.
1Id.
"Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170.
'723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a purchase-sale agreement2
which deferred the payment of the purchase price of stock by use of an escrow
arrangement, enabled the seller to shift income recognition by the seller until
the taxable year when the purchase price was actually received.
The Court permitted the intended deferral of income because, as stated
in the conclusion to its opinion, the escrow arrangement fulfilled three condi-
tions: (1) the arrangement was part of a bona fide, arms-length agreement be-
tween purchaser and seller calling for deferred payment; (2) the seller received
no present beneficial interest, such as investment income, from the escrowed
sale proceeds; and (3) the escrowee was not acting under the exclusive authority
of the taxpayer, and thus was not the taxpayer's agent for income recognition
purposes.' Thus, the Internal Revenue Service failed in applying three of its
favorite income-recognition theories - the constructive receipt, economic
benefit, and agency doctrines.
Because the IRS is unlikely to abandon these three doctrines in similar
cases in other jurisdictions, an examination of the First Circuit's criteria for
deferral of income recognition in a planning context may be useful.
In avoiding applications of the constructive receipt doctrine, use of a bona
fide, arms-length agreement for deferred payment is essential, since the time
of payment date set by such an agreement may be viewed as a "substantial
limitation" on the taxpayer's control of receipt.' The modification of an existing
purchase-sale agreement, if such modification is bona fide and becomes bind-
ing prior to the time when the taxpayer's right to immediate payment has
vested, may serve as an effective "substantial limitation." 5 Since mutuality of
the agreed deferral appears to be so vitally important, however, a seller wishing
to defer payment of sale proceeds might have a better chance of withstanding
a constructive receipt attack by negotiating the deferral as part of an original
purchase-sale agreement that clearly references the parties' mutual interest in
the deferral in the agreement's preliminary recitations.6
2The agreement provided for a closing on December 27, 1983, at which time the proceeds were to be paid
to an independent bank, which was to release the proceeds to the selling shareholders on January 3, 1974.
The sale proceeded under this arrangement, which was memorialized in writing and executed immediately
prior to the December 27, 1983 closing. The basic agreement to sell was effectively in existence on November
23, 1973, when the purchaser exercised his option to purchase pursuant to a prior option agreement that
was amended to set a current price per share on October 16, 1973. Thus, the escrow arrangement was
a "last minute" amendment to the agreement of sale, although this final amendment also provided that
the taxpayer would remain on the company's board of directors after the stock sale. Id. at 140-141.
'Id. at 149.
4Treas. Reg.§ 1.451-2(a) (1979) states that "income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control
of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions."
'723 F.2d 138 at 144.
'A demonstration in the agreement that the deferral represents a compromise of opposing non-tax desires
of the parties would no doubt be a plus. For example, the parties might wish payments made and received
in different years for general accounting reasons relating to the buyer's and seller's separate financial postures.
In Reed, the buyer's financial backer wanted the stock transaction reflected on his books for the earlier
year, perhaps for some non-tax reason.
[Vol. 2
46
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol3/iss1/1
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1983
To avoid the economic benefit doctrine, a seller should forego any rights
to investment income earned while the sale proceeds are in escrow. Indeed,
an agreement would best be drafted so as to exclude any semblance of a pres-
ent beneficial interest in the escrowed funds favoring the seller. The agreement
might specifically recite that the funds cannot be assigned by the seller while
in escrow and that the parties do not intend the escrowed funds to serve as
present payment of the purchase price but rather intend the escrow account
to serve as added assurance that payment will be made in the next year.7 Of
course, the financial effect of such restrictions (especially foregoing interest
on the fund) will assume greater importance to the seller as the proposed period
of deferral lengthens.
Avoiding characterization of the escrowee as the seller's agent for pur-
poses of income recognition is best accomplished by emphasizing in the agree-
ment, once again, the buyer's role in the deferral. The sale agreement should
refer to the buyer's authority granted to the escrowee to hold the purchase pro-
ceeds until the later distribution date. The escrow agreement itself should show
that the escrowee is to act on behalf of both parties,8 and it certainly would
not hurt to have the escrow fee, if any, clearly reflected as a joint expense in
the closing statement to the transaction.
26. Tax Consequences of a Personal Residence Raffle
The Internal Revenue Service recently outlined in Revenue Ruling 83-130,'
the tax consequences to taxpayers when a personal residence is sold through
a raffle held by a charitable organization. Such a raffle has tax consequences
to the person from whom the residence is acquired by the charitable organiza-
tion, as well as the winner of the raffle.
The situation presented involved the following facts. A Mr. Miner entered
into a contract with a charitable organization, Good Deed, Inc., under which
Good Deed acquired a 60-day option to buy Mr. Miner's principal residence
for $100,000. Good Deed paid $100 for the option, which if exercised would
be applied towards the purchase price. The contract further provided that if
Good Deed failed to sell $120,000 in raffle tickets by the end of the 60-day
period, the option would lapse, and Mr. Miner could keep the $100.
Good Deed, Inc. sold $200,000 worth of raffle tickets at $100 per ticket
and the option was exercised. Mr. Miner received $99,900 for his property;
the fair market value was $100,000. Mr. Miner did not use the proceeds of
the sale to purchase another principal residence. Mr. Placer won the raffle after
purchasing a raffle ticket for $100.
'The First Circuit Court concluded that such was the intention of the parties in Reed. This is true even
though the decision does not mention whether the agreement of sale specifically referenced the intention
of the parties in this regard. 723 F.2d 138 at 148.
'Id. at 149.
'Rev. Rul. 83-130, 1983-2 C.B. 148.
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The IRS determined that the taxable gain to Mr. Miner, the seller of the
residence, would be the amount realized from the sale ($100,000) less his ad-
justed basis of the property ($30,000). The Service further stated that Mr. Miner
had not made a charitable contribution to Good Deed, Inc. since the price paid
by Good Deed reflected the fair market value of the residence at the time the
option contract was entered into.
The amounts paid to Good Deed, Inc. by the purchasers of the raffle tickets
were not contributions and thus were not deductible. The Service reasoned that
taxpayers are not entitled to claim a deduction for amounts paid to a charitable
organization since they receive a chance to win a valuable prize as full con-
sideration for their contribution.'
Purchasers of losing raffle tickets are allowed a deduction only to the ex-
tent of the gains from other wagering transactions. If the purchaser is not in
the trade or business of wagering, the deduction is allowable only if the pur-
chaser itemizes deductions.'
The winner of the raffle must include in his gross income $99,900. This
figure represents the difference between the fair market value of the house and
the cost of the winning ticket.
This Revenue Ruling serves as a reminder that even though a charitable
organization may be involved in a transaction, the other parties involved may
not be entitled to a charitable deduction for payments or value transferred to
the charity.
27. Broker Reporting Requirements and Barter Income
Recent Revenue Rulings and newly issued regulations have clarified whether
certain bartered exchanges result in includable income and whether informa-
tion returns must be filed respecting brokered transactions.
For general tax purposes, it is clear that any type of income from any
source must be included in an individual's gross income.I In the case of barter
exchanges where the services or property of one individual are exchanged for
the services or property of another individual, the person receiving the services
must include the value of those services in his gross income.2 However, until
recently it was unclear whether a barter club member who had agreed to pro-
vide services to other members, must include the value of any services received
'Goldman v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 136 (1966), aff'd 388 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1967).
31.R.C. § 165(d) (1982).
I.R.C. § 61 (1982), see also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (1979) (providing that income realized in the form of
money, property, or services must be included in gross income).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1979), (when the services received are paid for by providing services, the fair
market value of the services taken in payment must be included in gross income); see also Rev. Rul. 79-24,
1979-1 C.B. 60, holding that where a club directory is used to directly contact other barter club members
and the value of the services are then negotiated, the fair market value of services received by the club
members must be included in their gross income.
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if that member had not yet provided any services in exchange. A 1983 Revenue
Ruling3 clarified this question and required the inclusion in gross income, as
advanced compensation of the value of services in the taxable year in which
they were received. Consequently, a person joining a barter club and agreeing
to provide services to other club members must include in his gross income
the value of any services received, even though those services are received as
advanced compensation for services yet to be rendered .4 The inclusion of serv-
ices as advanced compensation is premised on the theory that gross income
includes income received under a claim of right, not having any restrictions
on its disposition, even though that income may have to be partially or fully
repaid in the future.'
Recently finalized Regulations6 clarify reporting requirements for brokers
and barter exchanges. In general, the new regulations treat brokers7 separately
from barter exchanges.' All "brokers" must file an information return for any
sale9 by a customer'" unless the sale meets one of certain stated exceptions."
Thus, no information return is required for certain exempt recipients. 2 Nor
is one required in situations where a broker is instructed by a registered com-
modities or securities dealer or a financial institution to initiate a sale. '3 Also
exempt from the filing requirement are certain sales by custodians and trustees, 4
certain sales of interests in a regulated investment company,' 5 obligor payments
'Rev. Rul. 83-163, 1983-2 C.B. 26.
'In Rev. Rul. 83-163, the individuals joining the barter club agreed to provide specific services to any
other member for a specified number of hours. In exchange, the joining member could demand the serv-
ices of any member listed in the club directory by contacting that member directly.
'Rev. Rul. 83-163, 1983-2 C.B. 26, citing North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1 (1983).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(1) (1983) defines "broker" as a person who in the ordinary course of a trade
or business during the calendar year stands ready to effect sales involving others.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(4) (1983) defines "barter exchange" as any person with members or clients
that contract either with each other or with such person to trade or barter property or services either directly
or through such person.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(9) (1983) defines "sale" generally as any disposition of securities, commodities,
regulated futures contracts, or forward contracts for cash, and includes redemptions of stock, retirements
of indebtedness, and enterings into short sales.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(2) (1983) defines "customer" as the person (other than such broker) that makes
the sale, if the broker acts as an agent, a principal, or as a participant in paying or crediting to that per-
son's account the gross proceeds of the sale.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(i) (1983). For purposes of this exception, exempt recipients are those described
in Code Section 3452(c)(2)(A) through (E) or (G) through (I). These include a corporation, tax-exempt
organization, the United States or a state.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(ii) (1983), (these are exempt under Code Section 3452(c)(2)(F) or (K) (i)).
See also Rev. Rul. 83-123, 1983-2 C.B. 221, holding that information returns are not required of a broker
when that broker receives instructions relating to a sale from a registered securities or commodities dealer
or a financial institution. However, it is also noted that the dealer or financial institution would generally
be required to file the information return.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(iii) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(iv) (1983).
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on certain obligations, '6 certain callable obligations,' 7 certain sales of foreign
currency,'I certain sales of fractional shares of stock,' 9 and certain retirements
of book entry or registered form obligations.2"
The regulations further provide that information returns filed by brokers
must be done on a transactional basis2' and must include the name, address,
and taxpayer identification number of the customer as well as other specified
information.22 The broker must also elect a reporting period23 and a filing
group.2 ' All of the required information returns must then be filed according
to such period and filing group designations.25 The regulations provide special
rules governing the manner in which regulated future contracts are required
to be reported.2 6 The normal filing procedures are not to be used for sales of
such nature.
The requirements for filing information returns for barter exchanges are
slightly different. The difference in treatment is partially due to the differing
characteristics between brokers and barter exchanges. Thus, no information
returns need to be filed unless there are at least one-hundred exchanges27 made
through the barter exchange for any calendar year.2" If this exemption is not
met, the barter exchange is required to file an information return for all
exchanges.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(v) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(vi) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(vii) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(viii) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(3)(ix) (1983).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(d)(2) (1983). Information for each sale or transaction is required on a separate
form. T.D. 7873, 1983-1 C.B. 307, 308 points out that transactional reporting is necessary so that the
amount received in the sale of property can be matched with the basis of the property to accurately determine
gross income. In addition, most uses of the information by the Service require the information to be in
the form of transactional data.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(d)(2) (1983). Other required information includes the property sold, the C.U.S.I.P.
number (Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures number) if known, gross proceeds,
and sale date. It should also be noted that Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(d)(4) provides that except for short
sales, a broker may report a sale as occurring on the date the sale is entered on the books of the broker
or the date the customer becomes entitled to the gross proceeds.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(6)(i) (1983). An elected filing period may be the calendar month, quarter, or year.
1'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(6)(ii) (1983). Customers can be filed into groups according to the broker's office,
branch, department, or other method of operational classification.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1 (c)(6)(i)(b) and (ii)(b) (1983) provides that elected filing methods can be changed
upon subsequent filings.
:'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(c)(5) (1983).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(e)(2)(i) (1983). Exchanges of properties or services are considered bartered exchanges
if payment for the property or service is accomplished by a credit on the barter exchange's books, a scrip
issued by a barter exchange, or direct exchanges of property or services among the barter exchange's members
or clients.
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(e)(2)(ii) (1983). Multiple barter exchanges may be considered as one for purposes
of this requirement if it is determined that the material purpose of forming or continuing multiple barter
exchange was to meet this exception.
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Exchanges made by noncorporate members or clients must be reported
on a transactional basis.29 However, exchanges by corporate members or clients3"
can be reported on an aggregate basis.3" These returns must include the name,
address, and taxpayer identification number of the member or client providing
the property or services in the exchange as well as other information.32 Unlike
the reporting period election provided to brokers, barter exchanges have no
election and must use the calendar year as the reporting period.33
With respect to both brokers and barter exchanges the regulations set forth
rules concerning the time and place for filing,3 ' the furnishing of statements"
and the manner in which the information should be filed. 3 In addition, the
regulations provide that the customer is identified by the name that appears
on the books and records of the broker or barter exchange.37 The regulations
also provide that no information return need be filed if the participating member,
client, or customer is an exempt foreign individual.3"
28. Like-Kind Exchange Treatment for Serialized Exchanges
Section 10311 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for nonrecognition
of gain or loss if property held for use in a trade or business or held for invest-
ment is exchanged solely for like-kind property to be held for use in a trade
or business or held for investment. In Garcia v. Commissioner,2 the Court held
that an exchange of residential real property held for investment effected by
a series of transactions involving four parties, three properties, and three inter-
related escrow agreements, was a qualifying exchange for nonrecognition of
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(f)(2)(i) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(f)(2)(ii) (1983) defines a corporate member or client as a corporation defined
in code section 7701(a)(3) and includes a pool, syndicate, partnership or unincorporated association composed
exclusively of corporations.
"Initially, all barter exchange information returns were required to be reported on a transactional basis;
see T.D. 7873, 1983-1 C.B. 307, 314. However, the regulations were subsequently amended to permit
aggregate reporting for corporate members or clients in order to reduce the reporting burden on barter
exchanges; see T.D. 7932, 1984-6 I.R.B. 8. Aggregate reporting permits the barter exchange to aggregate
all exchanges received or provided by a corporate member or client on one information return form instead
of using numerous forms for each individual transaction.
3'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(f)(2)(i) and (ii) (1983). Additional information includes the property or services
provided, the amount received by the member or client for such property or services, and the date on
which the exchange occurred. For aggregate reporting the amounts are aggregated into a single figure
for the entire reporting period.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(f)(6) (1983).
1
4Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-10) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(k) (1983).
3'Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(1) (1983). Information returns should be filed on magnetic media unless excepted
by undue hardship.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(h) (1983).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(g) (1983).
Editor's Note: Treasury Regulation § 1.6045-1(c)(3) was amended by the IRS in a temporary rule filed
May 23, 1984. See Temp. Reg. § 5f.6045-1 (1984).
I.R.C. § 1031 (1976).
80 T.C. 491 (1983).
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gain under Section 1031.
The taxpayers in Garcia were the owners of residential real property held
as rental property. Taxpayers, wishing to dispose of this property and at the
same time take advantage of the nonrecognition provisions of Section 1031,
found a buyer, F, who was willing to cooperate with them in arranging a series
of transactions. Taxpayers and F established an escrow account and escrow
agreement A, to accommodate the sale of the taxpayer's property to F, and
F agreed to cooperate in finding suitable exchange property for the taxpayers.
The escrow agreement provided that F could terminate the agreement if suitable
property was not found within sixty days.
Suitable property for the exchange, belonging to H, was found. H was
willing to cooperate in the transfer but also wanted to take advantage of the
nonrecognition provisions of Section 1031 by exchanging his property for prop-
erty owned by G. In order to effect these transfers and accommodate all par-
ties involved, two additional escrow accounts, B and C, were established. In
addition, to eliminate the possibility of boot being realized in the transaction,
the escrow agreements provided that H was to secure a new deed of trust in
the amount of $107,200, to equalize the liability to which the taxpayer's prop-
erty was subject at the time of transfer.
All of the escrow agreements involved referred to the taxpayers' intent
to effect an exchange of their property to obtain the benefit of Section 1031.
All of the agreements were subject to and conditioned upon the simultaneous
closings of all escrow accounts. All escrow accounts were closed simultaneously,
the end result being that taxpayers received title to the property formerly owned
by H subject to deeds of trust in the amount of $107,250.
Taxpayers reported no taxable gain on their income tax return for the year
these exchanges were effected. The Internal Revenue Service contended that
the exchanges constructed by taxpayers did not qualify for nonrecognition of
gain under Section 1031 and that a gain of approximately $101,994 was to be
recognized by taxpayers. The Service argued that the transactions involved a
sale of taxpayers' property followed by a reinvestment of the proceeds. Alter-
natively, the Service contended that the taxpayers constructively received the
cash transferred by F to escrow account A and thus received taxable boot in
the exchange.
The Court first considered the applicability of the nonrecognition provi-
sions of Section 1031 to the transaction. The Court looked to the parties' in-
tent and found, pursuant to the escrow agreements, a stated desire for
nonrecognition exchange treatment. It found that the parties to the transaction
took steps consistent with this expressed intent and did, in fact, effect a proper
exchange transaction. To support its analysis, the Court cited Biggs v.
[Vol. 2
52
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol3/iss1/1
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1983
Commissioner and Starker v. United States,4 which involved similar findings
under Section 1031 in situations involving multi-party exchanges.
The Court also analyzed the transaction to see if any boot was received
by the taxpayers, since recognition results to the extent that other than like-
kind property is received. The key inquiry focused on the deposit of cash by
F into the A escrow account with respect to the purchase of taxpayers' property.
The Court found that taxpayers did not actually or constructively receive the
cash at any time while the transfers were effected, since "substantial restric-
tions" were placed on these monies by the escrow agreements. In addition,
F, the purchaser, had a right to cancel the agreement if suitable property was
not found within sixty days. Thus, no party had any right to withdraw these
funds during that time. Finally, at the time the transfer was actually made,
H had been substituted for taxpayers as seller of the parcel, and, thus taxpayers
were not parties to the contract. The Service asserted that H was merely acting
as taxpayers' agent, but the Court rejected this argument citing Alderson v.
Commissioner and stating that "One need not assume the benefits and burdens
of ownership in property before exchanging it but may properly acquire title
solely for the purpose of exchange and accept title and transfer it in exchange
for other like property." 6
The Service also challenged nonrecognition treatment on the basis that
no reference was made as to a required purpose for the earnest money deposited
by F into escrow A. The Court rejected this argument based upon the parties'
overlying intention to effect a proper exchange. Additionally, the escrow
accounts were to be closed simultaneously and were subject to and conditioned
upon each other. The Court stated that such contractual interdependence
was indicative of a proper exchange transaction. There was sufficient evidence
to find an integrated plan for exchange treatment, so that the step transaction
doctrine could be applied to find that a qualified exchange had occurred. 7
Having decided that the transaction qualified for the nonrecognition pro-
vision of Section 1031, the Court addressed the issue of boot respecting the
taxpayers' relief from substantial liabilities through the sale of their property.
The Court found that since the liabilities assumed by the taxpayers pursuant
to the deed of trust on their new property exceeded the liabilities from which
they were relieved, no boot was received.
In the case of Antonio D'Onofrio the Tax Court held that the nonrecogni-
tion provisions of Section 1031 were inapplicable to a transaction that amounted
'69 T.C. 905 (1978).
'602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
'317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
'Id. at 795.
'69 T.C. 905 (1978).
'52 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 83,632 (1983).
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to a sale and reinvestment rather than an exchange. The key difference be-
tween D'Onofrio and Garcia is that although the taxpayers in both cases ex-
pressed a desire and intent to effect an exchange transaction, the taxpayer in
D'Onofrio in effect made a sale to a third party, unrelated to the exchanging
parties, and cash received from the sale was combined with property to effect
the like-kind exchange. Thus, the gain recognized on the sale of property to
the third party did not qualify for nonrecognition under Section 1031. In Garcia
the proper use of interdependent escrow agreements avoided such result.
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